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IMAGING BRAINS, CHANGING MINDS: HOW PAIN
NEUROIMAGING CAN INFORM THE LAW
A.C. Pustilnik*
ABSTRACT
What would the law do differently if it could see into the black box of
the mind? One of the most valuable things it might do is reform the ways it
deals with pain. Pain is ubiquitous in law, from tort to torture, from ERISA
to expert evidence. Yet legal doctrines grapple with pain poorly,
embodying concepts that are generations out of date and that cast
suspicion on pain sufferers as having a problem that is “all in their
heads.”
Now, brain-imaging technologies are allowing scientists to see the
brain in pain—and to reconceive of many types of pain as
neurodegenerative diseases. Brain imaging proves that the problem is in
sufferers’ heads: Long-term pain shrinks the brain and changes the way it
functions.
This new science has immediate practical and theoretical applications
for the law. This Article first proposes reforms to disability law doctrines
and their judicial interpretation. It then proposes ways in which pain
neuroimaging ought to be handled as a matter of expert evidence in state,
federal, and administrative proceedings. Drawing on work in evidence
theory, it considers black letter evidence law as well as normative practices
that shape how decision makers weigh evidence and credibility. It also
offers limits on the use of brain images.
In opening a window into how the brain generates subjective
experiences, neuroimaging should lead to doctrinal and practice-based
revisions that increase law’s accuracy and fairness. So doing, brain
imaging should change the law’s mind about the nature of pain and may
require the law to rethink its dualism between body and mind.
ABSTRACT................................................................................................ 1099
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INTRODUCTION
Pain is a legal, philosophical, and human conundrum. Pain is at once a
physical state and an emotional experience, and thus exists at the nexus of
body and mind; nowhere is the law’s casual dualism between mind and
body more uneasily maintained than in questions of pain. Legal rights,
proscriptions, and statuses turn on the presence or absence of pain, and its
amount: Questions involving pain span legal domains from tort to torture,
from constitutional law to administrative regulation. Pain accounts for
hundreds of billions of dollars of direct economic costs and lost
productivity annually—and yet, pain is largely invisible, unquantifiable,
and often grossly misunderstood, leading to unnecessary suffering on the
part of people whose pain is not credited and to unnecessary expense when
the legal and medical systems function inefficiently or the wrong claimants
are compensated.
What would the law do differently if it could see pain, as is
increasingly possible through new neuroimaging technologies?
In important legal domains, the imaging of pain ought to change the
law a great deal. This Article is about where law ought to change because
of innovations in pain science brought about primarily through structural
and functional imaging of the brain in pain. In the last two decades,
structural and functional brain imaging, along with other brain- and nonbrain-based research modalities, have fundamentally transformed the way
doctors and scientists understand chronic pain. From an elusive and
speculative condition, often characterized by treating doctors and by the
legal system as a form of hysteria, malingering, or fraud, researchers and
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clinicians now understand many chronic pain conditions to involve
neurological signaling disorders or to constitute brain disorders in
themselves.
This revolution in brain-pain sciences ought to change the law in at
least two important areas that are the subject of this Article: disability and
evidence law. Chronic pain is the single largest category of disability under
the Social Security Disability (SSD) regime.1 Yet, the regulations about
what constitutes disability are in places silent about pain and in other places
confoundingly circular. Pain science, this Article argues, is now
sufficiently developed for policymakers and scholars to improve the law’s
treatment of pain in important ways, including to revise the SSD regime
relating to chronic pain.
If the current SSD regulations are lacking, judicial interpretations
thereof have done little to improve them: In their efforts to gap-fill, circuit
judges in federal courts across the United States, who hear appeals of
administrative disability denials, have developed their own interpretations
of when chronic pain can and cannot constitute a disability. These
standards vary by circuit from under-defined and over-permissive to
draconian. The same medical evidence leads to different outcomes based
purely on where an appeal is taken, violating the principle of horizontal
equity.
Some judicial interpretations of the regulations express a view of the
chronic pain claimant as suspect, as seeking recognition for emotional
wounds in the guise of physical complaints. Judges and other
commentators who hold such views are channeling a deep cultural current,
as the history of pain in law and medicine is one of doubt about pain’s
reality and of constructing the pain sufferer as hysterical. When apprised of
new pain science, judges may choose a different approach to these cases:
Circuit court judges are uniquely placed to change judicial interpretations
of pain-related disability to conform with current science, so that their
determinations can be more consistent and more fair, even before the
Social Security Administration (SSA) revises its regulations.
Chronic pain is also at issue in many litigated matters. These matters
may sound in tort law, ERISA, disability law, or workers’ compensation.
Accordingly, judges and jurors frequently need to evaluate evidence of
chronic pain. Direct evidence relating to a claimant’s medical condition is
already common in these kinds of proceedings. This Article argues that
expert testimony grounded in pain neuroimaging, and neuroimages
themselves, ought to be admissible for certain limited purposes: to educate
judges and jurors about the nature of chronic pain conditions and to inform

1. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2012).
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them as to the causes, manifestations, and likely prognoses for these
conditions.
Evidence, although notionally a rule-based enterprise, is highly
normative. Determinations about what evidence is relevant and reliable,
and thus admissible, take place against background expectations or
schemas: How well does the evidence presented match what the decision
makers expect to see and believe to be credible? Evidence embraces the
narrative character of the trial and extends to the evaluative process of
judges and juries. These “soft” aspects of evidence may be more influential
than the rules themselves in shaping litigation and its outcomes.
Background expectations or schemas may be informative; they also may
mislead. In cases involving chronic pain, jurors and judges alike may hold
mistaken beliefs about chronic pain’s causes, presentation, and persistence.
Introducing educative evidence about chronic pain could have a debiasing
role, equivalent to steps some jurisdictions have taken to permit expert
testimony debunking other common but erroneous beliefs, like the nowdiscredited beliefs about the infallibility of eyewitness identification.
Drawing on narrative theory, evidence theory, and behavioral
economic accounts of decision making, this Article recommends ways in
which neuroimaging evidence could improve accuracy in trials by changing
the background or default expectations of judges and fact finders. Turning
to black letter or “hard” aspects of evidence law, this Article argues that
aggregate pain neuroimaging evidence ought to be admissible under the
federal, state, and administrative evidence regimes for certain, limited
purposes. However, brain imaging technology is not a pain-o-meter or a
mind-reading machine. Rather, it is a tool for increasing the law’s
understanding about how the brain works and how the law can do better at
adjudicating important questions that lie at the intersection of the brain,
body, and mind.
***
Part I of this Article describes three problems that legal regimes have in
adjudicating claims relating to chronic pain: visual bias, the doctrine of
“excess pain,” and doctrines and norms that confuse chronic pain disorders
with psychiatric hysterical disorders. These problems show the state of the
law itself and also of legal culture and norms relating to chronic pain.
Examining court opinions, legal doctrines, and other sources of legal
culture, it shows how antiquated or mistaken notions about chronic pain
affect legal decision making and lead to suboptimal outcomes. It points
toward the ways in which the neuroimaging advances in pain science can
begin to address these issues.
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Part II presents current research on chronic pain as a set of
neurologically involved disorders. Focusing on structural and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), it surveys the field and incorporates
information from interviews with leading pain researchers.
Parts III and IV turn to the ways in which this new science should
change two key areas of legal doctrine and practice. Part III analyzes Social
Security Disability regulations, showing how current neuroimaging
research could resolve significant doctrinal and applied problems. It
outlines proposals to reform regulations that define when chronic pain
constitutes disability, to modify judicial interpretations of the regulations,
and to educate adjudicators about pain science.
Part IV turns to evidence law. Exploring evidence law theory, it shows
how narrative expectations, culturally received norms, and cognitive
predispositions like confirmation bias contribute to poor outcomes for
chronic pain claimants and shows how pain neuroimaging could be used to
modify decision makers’ beliefs and perceptions. Going beyond the black
letter law, the normative analysis in this section has implications for
proceedings in tort, ERISA, and a range of other types of claims. The
section concludes by proposing where neuroimaging should, and should
not, be admissible.
I. THREE PROBLEMS OF PAIN IN LAW
Pain arises as a problem, and problematically, in some of the most
important and ubiquitous areas of the law: federal and state administrative
law, particularly Social Security Disability and workers’ compensation
regimes; federal and state disability law; the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA);2 and tort. Claimants come to the legal forum to
allege that their pain disables them partially or totally from working, that
their insurer has wrongfully misclassified them as not disabled or denied
them coverage for needed pain treatments, that their employer has failed to
make a reasonable accommodation for their condition, or that a defendant’s
negligence wrongfully caused the claimant to suffer ongoing and possible
future pain. Pain is not only legally pervasive but staggeringly costly:
Chronic pain costs the U.S. economy $635 billion each year in medical
costs and lost productivity;3 government disability benefits, including
benefits to people disabled by pain, amount to approximately $130 billion;4
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)).
3. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA: A
BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, CARE, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH 91 (2011).
4. Disability Insurance Benefit Payments, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4a6.html (last visited May 8, 2014). This figure represents all
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and pain and suffering damages in tort, although hard to estimate reliably,5
may amount to $50 billion per year.6
These kinds of cases present the usual difficulties that the legal system
faces in adjudicating any matter: Decision makers must assess the strength
of the parties’ claims, including the weight of their evidence and their
credibility. Yet, cases involving claims of pain also present unique
problems, problems embedded in the fabric of the law and also in the
norms, expectations, and practices of legal decision makers relating to
questions of pain.
This Part focuses on three problems relating to pain in the law: courts’
emphasis on the wrong kinds of evidence of pain; the doctrine of “excess
pain” and its implicit or shadow notion of reasonable pain; and the notion
that chronic pain, particularly pain that is not linked to obvious tissue
damage or anatomical abnormalities, is the product of psychiatric illness.
These problems, significant in themselves, point more generally to the
kinds of problems that recur throughout black letter law and legal culture in
cases involving claims of pain. These illustrative issues are interrelated in
that they individually and collectively show the law’s interest in visual
corroboration of pain; its struggle to understand seemingly inexplicable
variation in pain across individuals; and, at times, a suspicion of pain
claimants as a category.
A. Doubt About Pain and the Search for Visual Evidence
Courts struggle with questions relating to the reality and verifiability of
chronic pain and appear to struggle in particular with the invisibility of
pain. Pain’s invisibility is its famous problem: As the seminal scholar on
pain, Elaine Scarry, explained, pain “may seem to have . . . no reality
because it has not yet manifested itself on the visible surface of the earth.”7
Adjudicators may reject well-substantiated claims where the claimant does
not offer visual medical evidence like X-rays or MRIs, even though such
technologies are often irrelevant to pain diagnosis.8 Conversely, when
adjudicators look at X-rays, MRIs, and other visual evidence that does
payments to qualifying people with disabilities; this is not a figure for payments exclusively to people
disabled by chronic pain. Breakdowns of benefits payments by disability type are not available.
5. See Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain
and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 235–37 n.84 (1993) (asserting that “all
of the published empirical studies of pain and suffering awards should be viewed with great suspicion
as to their reliability, validity, and meaning”). Vidmar analyzes the factors that make rigorous estimates
difficult in this area and that contribute to the inaccuracy of existing ballpark estimates.
6. John Fabian Witt, The Political Economy of Pain, in MAKING LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF WILLIAM E. NELSON 235, 237 (Daniel J. Hulsebosch & R.B. Bernstein, eds. 2013).
7. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 3 (1985).
8. See infra notes 63–71 and accompanying text.
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not—and cannot—show pain, they use these images as corroboration for
their intuition that pain not tied to a visible problem does not exist: If the
image does not show it, it must not be real.
In Minor v. Commissioner of Social Security, the claimant alleged
disability due to lifelong chronic headaches exacerbated by a closed-head
trauma sustained in a high-speed car accident.9 She underwent dozens of
hospitalizations, several spinal and brain surgeries, and the implantation of
a spinal pain modulator.10 She also submitted evidence of some thirty
diagnostic tests supporting her diagnoses.11 The administrative law judge
denied her claim, and the district court affirmed, with both courts noting
that Minor’s claims of crippling headache and back pain were not credible
because she did not present MRIs or “venograms” showing gross brain
damage.12 However, as the appellate court noted, MRI and venogram data
would be irrelevant to demonstrating the kinds of pain the claimant alleged,
a fact to which the Agency’s own examining expert testified.13 Similarly, in
Ketelboeter v. Astrue, the court rejected the claimant’s assertion of severe
chronic pain because X-rays did not “corroborate[] the claimed increase in
[chest] pain that [the claimant] reported over time,” although it would be
the rare form of chest pain that would show up on an X-ray.14
Judges’ findings that claimants did not have disabling pain because
they had no abnormal X-rays or similar imaging shows their search for the
smoking gun (a crushed pelvis, a bulging disc), the visible thing that causes
the pain. This manifests an attachment to the superseded “peripheral injury
model.”15
This emphasis on visual proof stems, too, from an aspect of our visual
culture, a kind of “naïve visual realism” in which, “[i]f seeing is believing,
having something to look at offers a reliable ground for belief, so visual
evidence is the best sort of evidence there is.”16 Professor Neil Feigenson
explains that, in areas where judges or jurors review visual evidence, they
become “overconfident in their [own] interpretations . . . and less receptive
to alternative viewpoints”; further, reviewing such evidence—or the
absence of such evidence where the evidence is expected—serves to
“entrench the effects of other, first-order biases.”17

9. 513 F. App’x 417, 418–22 (6th Cir. 2013) (reciting history below).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 425.
12. Id. at 431, 433 (reversing holding below).
13. Id. at 435–36.
14. 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008).
15. See infra Part II.A (discussing peripheral and central models of chronic pain).
16. Neal Feigenson, Visual Common Sense, in LAW, CULTURE AND VISUAL STUDIES 105, 108
(Anne Wagner & Richard K. Sherwin eds., 2014).
17. Id. at 105.
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Put more simply, judges or jurors will see what they expect to see when
visual evidence is presented, consistent with prior beliefs (“first-order
biases”);18 and if they expect to see visual evidence that is not forthcoming,
they will draw adverse inferences that are also consistent with those prior
beliefs. A judge or juror may believe that most back pain is caused by
spinal abnormalities (it is not). If a claimant alleges disabling back pain,
that decision maker would expect to see X-rays or MRIs showing a
deformed spine. If the claimant’s evidence shows normal spinal anatomy,
the decision maker will not be “receptive to” alternative explanations for
the pain and may dismiss other supportive (but not visual) medical
evidence.19
Neuroimaging may help by showing brain alterations and atrophy
associated with chronic pain. This is not to say that brain imaging can
prove chronic pain in the same way that an X-ray can prove a broken leg.
Neuroimaging is not a pain-o-meter and is not suitable as individual proof
of pain. Rather, as discussed in Parts II and III, imaging can show decision
makers that pain has a brain-based, biological reality independent of
peripheral damage, giving a visual basis to believe in the reality of pain
while taking away the expectation that a “pain picture” will correlate the
degree of pain to the degree of damage.
B. The Reasonable Pain Standard and the Problem of “Excess Pain”
“Excess pain” is the legal term of art decision makers apply when they
find that a claimant is alleging more pain than is thought to be typical for
the claimant’s disease or injury and, further, that the level of pain is not
supported by objective medical tests like X-rays.20 No source of law
defines the ostensibly correct or non-excessive amount of pain for each
condition; indeed, the SSA itself explicitly recognizes that pain can be
subjective and variable.21 Thus, in the absence of concrete guidance about
reasonable or typical pain, initial and reviewing judges are left to make the
18. Id.; see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the
Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 17 (1998) (describing the definitive history on the
conflicted early acceptance and ultimate triumph of photographic evidence in the courtroom).
19. Visual culture in evidence law is an area of study in its own right. In addition to the Wagner
& Sherwin volume, supra note 16, interested readers should see generally Mnookin, supra note 18, and
Christopher J. Buccafusco, Gaining/Losing Perspective on the Law, or Keeping Visual Evidence in
Perspective, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 609 (2004).
20. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Standard and Sufficiency of Evidence When Evaluating
Severity of Claimant’s Pain in Social Security Disability Case Under § 3(a)(1) of Social Security
Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(5)(A), 165 A.L.R. FED. 203, § 3 (2000)
(defining “excess pain” as “pain that is unsupported by objective medical findings,” such as X-ray); see
also, e.g., Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986) (defining “excess pain” as pain
beyond the level typically associated with a particular medical condition) (internal citation omitted).
21. SSR 88-13, 1988 WL 236011 (July 20, 1988).
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determination of whether a claimant’s pain is unreasonable in relation to
the claimant’s injury or disease. They make this determination based in part
on medical evidence submitted in the case, but also based on their own
judgment against the background of what they know or believe about the
degree of pain caused by different conditions.22
Judges vary tremendously in what they consider to be excess pain for
particular conditions. While some judges do credit that different people
experience pain very differently, others suspect that high levels of alleged
pain implicitly raise a presumption of exaggeration, fraud, or even
psychiatric problems.23 This leads to heightened scrutiny of evidence
corroborating the claimant’s alleged level of pain and, frequently, adverse
credibility determinations about the claimant.
Garcia v. Colvin illustrates the discretion vested in judges to determine
whether pain is reasonable or excessive in relation to the claimed
conditions.24 It also shows the uncertainty and suspicion adjudicators may
bring to cases they characterize as involving excess pain. In Garcia, the
claimant presented with lupus, colitis, sickle cell disease, Hepatitis C,
abdominal hernia, and terminal cirrhosis of the liver.25 He had been taken
off the liver transplant list because doctors determined that he could not
survive transplant surgery.26 Garcia’s doctors and an Agency-appointed
examiner concluded Garcia was completely disabled.27
An ALJ determined that Garcia was complaining of “excess pain”
because, in the judge’s view, his pain exceeded typical levels for his
various conditions.28 On that basis, the ALJ concluded that Garcia was “not
credible,” and further dismissed Garcia’s partner’s testimony that Garcia
frequently awoke screaming from pain as “self-serving.”29 The court
concluded that claimant “must have been exaggerating” because he did not
consistently seek pain-relief treatment; however, Garcia, an unemployed
laborer, only failed to seek treatment during the times when he lacked
health insurance.30 After Garcia exhausted his administrative appeals, a
federal district court affirmed.31

22. Wooster, supra note 20, at § 3 (describing judicial process).
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. 741 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013).
25. Id. at 759.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The ALJ further concluded Garcia’s pain could not be as severe as Garcia claimed
because Garcia could “rise . . . to a standing position, . . . and [] walk heel to toe” in a brief examination.
Id. at 761.
30. Id. (emphasis in original).
31. Id. (citing the district court opinion).
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The Seventh Circuit eventually reversed, severely criticizing the
judgment exercised by the lower courts.32 This case might be viewed as a
one-off; there are occasional mistaken outcomes in every area of law.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, per Judge Posner,
used Garcia as an opportunity to criticize what the court described as a
general problem with excess pain cases: that of administrative courts
dismissing claims of excess pain with “boilerplate language” and of failing
to credit well-substantiated and independent evidence of pain because the
adjudicators found the level of pain claimed to be unreasonable.33
Garcia is an extreme case,34 but not an isolated one.35 It demonstrates
general problems with the doctrine and the concept of excess pain: First,
there is no general or typical amount of pain that particular conditions
produce. As presented in Part II, pain scientists and clinicians forcefully
reject the notion of a typical or standard pain experience; the same injury
can heal completely in one individual while producing lifelong pain in
another.36 The legal standard regarding “excess pain” invites decision
makers to decide for themselves how much pain is legitimate for any given
condition, turning a medical determination into a normative and credibility
determination. This opens the door to a wide range of judicial perspectives
and degrees of knowledge about the subjective variability of pain and
perhaps to view individuals who claim unreasonable pain (a medically
nonsensical concept) as unreasonable people.
C. Pain as Mental Disorder in Sources of Legal and Cultural Authority
Numerous legal regimes treat mental and physical disorders differently,
privileging physical disorders. In some cases, courts have held that chronic
pain that lacks an obvious, visible cause (like bulging discs in the spine) is
not physically real but instead is a “mental disorder.”37 Aspects of disability
doctrine also construe this kind of pain—pain not linked to a visible cause

32. Id. at 758.
33. Id. at 765.
34. On review, the appellate court described itself as “astonished” at the lower courts’
determinations, and “surprised that the [Justice Department] would defend such a denial.” Id. at 762–
63, 765.
35. See, e.g., Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing the district court’s
conclusion claimant had “excess” pain; noting adjudicator may not substitute own judgment about how
much pain is appropriate for a particular injury); Shavin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 488 F. App’x
223 (9th Cir. 2012); Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2009); Hawkins v. First Union Corp.
Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003).
36. See infra at notes 67–71 and accompanying text (explaining that some people who sustain a
peripheral injury will develop central nervous system sensitization that causes chronic pain).
37. Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d 794,
799 (9th Cir. 1997).
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or lesion—to be psychiatric in nature.38 The conclusion that pain is a
“mental disorder” can make it not compensable under ERISA, as in the
case of Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote
Technology, Inc.39 The judicial conclusion that certain forms of chronic
pain are mental disorders leads to other problems as well: adjudicators have
held that chronic pain patients whose pain arises from mental disorder are
“flamboyant” exaggerators whose pain can only be credited if one believes
in a “medical fantasyland” where the unreal is magically real.40
Practice guides, too, perpetuate these negative characterizations.
Writing for The Social Security Reporter, an important journal of
administrative law, an ALJ advises other judges hearing cases involving
chronic pain to consider first the possibility of “converted mental
conflict.”41 Whether a claimant suffers from “organic” pain versus
“psychogenic” pain “should influence adjudication of entitlement quite
differently.”42 In this judge’s view, psychiatric pain should not be
compensable; “rewarding” the claimant for the psychiatric condition only
perpetuates the person’s disability rather than forcing him or her to
confront and fix the disability’s emotional causes.
Other authoritative sources reinforce these views. Treatises like
American Jurisprudence play an important role as repositories of legal
culture and sources of norm transmission. Current editions continue to
repeat nostrums about chronic pain that are a half-century or more out of
date. Among the first things that American Jurisprudence Proof of Facts
has to say in its section entitled “Modern physiopsychological concepts of
pain sensations” is that “the subconscious needs of the plaintiff-patient”
can cause him or her to “exaggerate pain”43 out of a subconscious “desire”
to be a victim.44 Chronic pain conditions that do not arise from an obvious
injury, it states, may indicate major mental illness.45 Complaints of chronic
pain may, it states, be the way that an emotionally afflicted individual
“call[s] for help.”46
A judicial determination that pain is psychiatric has important legal,
social, and practical implications. Tort law, among other areas of law, treats
38. See infra Part III.A.2.
39. 125 F.3d at 799.
40. Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2004) (Coffey, J., dissenting).
41. Patrick D. Halligan, Credibility, Chronic Pain, and Converted Mental Conflict: Some
Distinctions for Adjudicators, 38 SOC. SEC. REP. SER. 859, 859 (1993) (containing the advice of an
administrative law judge of the SSA serving in Wisconsin).
42. Id. at 859.
43. I. Alfred Breckler, Whether a Plaintiff Has Sustained Pain & Suffering, in 23 AM. JUR. 2D
Proof of Facts § 3 (2007).
44. Id. § 10.
45. Id. § 3, at 11.
46. Id. at 12.
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mental and physical disorders differently, privileging physical disorders.47
The conclusion that pain is a “mental disorder” can make it not
compensable under ERISA, as in the case of Lang, where the employer’s
insurance plan provided coverage for physical but not psychiatric
disability.48 It can cause a claimant to be denied certain medical treatments
that would be indicated for physiologically generated pain but not for pain
that is the product of psychiatric conversion. Finally, there is the social
stigma of being labeled as mentally ill. The message is chronic pain may be
a manifestation of major mental illness, or at least of a neurotic enjoyment
of victimhood.
This view that people who suffer (or complain of) chronic pain are
malingering or neurotic, or enjoy victimhood, although represented in legal
culture, does not originate in legal culture. Legal culture has received such
views from earlier work in various branches of medicine, particularly from
psychoanalysis. Under the psychoanalytic view, chronic pain exists
because the hysterical subject unconsciously produces symptoms as an
expression of his or her psychological need. The subject has some
emotionally painful conflict that she cannot confront; the repressed conflict
manifests itself as a physical symptom, through a process called
“somatization” (literally, embodiment).49
Chronic pain and psychoanalytic theory are intimately linked: Indeed,
the famed Anna O. sought treatment with Josef Breuer in part to help
resolve her chronic pain symptoms.50 Breuer and Sigmund Freud made her
case the centerpiece of their foundational work Studies on Hysteria, tracing
47. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 217–20 (1970) (discussing the relative
treatment of physical versus emotional harms in tort); see also Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible
Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 778–80 (1985).
48. 125 F.3d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 1997).
49. The definition of somatization is itself in a state of flux and controversy. The traditional
definition emphasizes its psychiatric character as well as the flamboyant presentation of people who
receive this diagnosis: “Somatization disorder is a psychiatric condition marked by multiple medically
unexplained physical, or somatic, symptoms. . . . [Patients] often use impressionistic and colorful
language to describe their symptoms. . . . While many symptoms resemble those associated with
genuine diseases, some of the symptoms reported by people with somatization disorder are not.”
Somatization disorder, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL DISORDERS, http://www.minddisorders.com/PyZ/Somatization-disorder.html#ixzz2vVhL8JZY (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). The National Institutes of
Health offers a more contemporary and less disparaging description of somatization, stating that
somatization is a “condition in which a person has physical symptoms that involve more than one part
of the body, but no physical cause can be found.” It describes somatization as currently undergoing a
reappraisal in which clinicians are identifying disorders of pain perception that lead to the diffuse and
nonspecific pain claims typical of patients labeled as somatizers. Somatization Disorder, MEDICINE
PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000955.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
50. Bertha Pappenheim, described as Anna O. in Breuer’s case study, sought treatment for
paralysis, head and neck pain, and fugue states. The case has “bedeviled the history of psychiatry ever
since and has been the object of every conceivable diagnosis.” Edward Shorter, What Was the Matter
with Anna O.?, in FREUD UNDER ANALYSIS 23, 24 (Todd DuFresne & Paul Roazen eds., 1997). We
may never know “what was the matter with Anna O.,” but we may still explore the influence of this
document on the history of medicine, law, and culture.
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her chronic pain to repressed psychic conflict.51 The Anna O. case also
embodies the magic trick of the talking cure: Breuer claimed that once
Anna O. identified and articulated her emotional conflicts, her physical
symptoms disappeared. Breuer’s claim was false: The real patient, named
Bertha Pappenheim, continued to suffer for many years but ultimately
learned to live with her pain.52 She went on to do important work, in spite
of great physical pain, in progressive politics, advocating for greater rights
for workers and children.53 Few remember Bertha Pappenheim, while the
literary construction known as Anna O. remains famous.
Part of the legacy of the Anna O. story is the enduring construction of
pain, particularly female pain,54 as fantasized and hysterical. It tells
decision makers to view the person who complains of pain as suspect and
emotionally disordered and cautions them not to fall into the trap of
“rewarding” the claimant by believing the pain is real, as this reinforces the
“syndrome.”
Although the notion that psychological conflict could produce physical
symptoms did not originate with Freud and his school,55 it found its fullest
expression and broadest acceptance through Freud’s writings.56 Early
members of Freud’s school asserted that a patient would convert psychic
distress into a bodily (“somatic”) symptom, relabeling what Freud
originally called “conversion hysteria.”57
Somatic disorder and conversion disorder remain psychiatric
diagnoses, although of steeply declining popularity: The DSM-IV-TR
cautions that these are uncommon conditions that ought not to be diagnosed
unless all non-psychiatric medical causes can be ruled out and only where
the pain anatomical distribution or symptoms do not follow any known

51. JOSEF BREUER & SIGMUND FREUD, STUDIES ON HYSTERIA 21 (1957).
MUSEUM,
52. Bertha
Pappenheim,
“Anna
O”
(1859–1936),
SCIENCE
www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/broughttolife/people/berthapappenheim.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
53. Marion A. Kaplan, Bertha Pappenheim: Founder of German-Jewish Feminism, in THE
JEWISH WOMAN: NEW PERSPECTIVES 149, 150–53 (Elizabeth Koltun ed., 1976).
54. See generally Sónia F. Bernardes & Maria Luísa Lima, On the Contextual Nature of SexRelated Biases in Pain Judgments, 15 EUR. J. PAIN 950 (2011) (studying bias in perceiving female pain
and finding that in certain cases women’s pain was perceived as less credible than men’s pain).
55. ANNE HARRINGTON, THE CURE WITHIN: A HISTORY OF MIND-BODY MEDICINE 54–60 (2009)
(describing the work of Jean-Martin Charcot, a teacher of Freud’s, on the development of the idea of the
unconscious); Malcolm MacMillan, Jean-Martin Charcot, in The FREUD ENCYCLOPEDIA: THEORY,
THERAPY, AND CULTURE 75, 75–80 (Edward Erwin ed., 2002).
56. Describing the hysterical invalid, Freud asserts: “Her state of ill-health will have every
appearance of being objective and involuntary—the very doctor who treats her will bear witness to that
fact; and for that reason, she will not need to feel any conscious self-reproaches . . . .” The Clinical
Picture, in VII THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD, 44–45 (1954–73).
57. Harold Merskey, The History of Pain and Hysteria, 8 NEUROREHABILITATION 157, 159
(1997) (describing history of the term “somatization”).
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medical criteria.58 This represents a marked shift from DSM-III, which did
not express any caveats or cautions; the transition from DSM-III to DSMIV shows the trend in psychiatry and general medicine to resist describing
most forms of chronic pain as “all in the patient’s head.”59 New
neuroimaging technologies now enable researchers to understand chronic
pain as “in the patient’s head” in a much more literal and less dismissive
way: As a set of pathologies grounded in central nervous system
processing, as described in Part II.
II. CURRENT PAIN SCIENCE AND THE POTENTIAL OF NEUROIMAGING
Brain science can now begin to show why certain relatively trivial
injuries may give rise to what looks like “excess” pain, why injuries that
have apparently healed may result in lifelong pain, and why some people
develop primary chronic pain disorders in the absence of any injury at all.
Structural imaging of the brain in pain shows that particular chronic pain
conditions result in the reshaping of certain brain structures, with the
degree of brain difference (or damage) correlating with the amount and
duration of the sufferer’s pain. Functional imaging shows reorganization in
the brain’s default network, how the brain engages in unconscious activity.
Moreover, these observed structural and functional changes are
explanatory: The regions affected map onto the symptomatology that
researchers observe and of which patients complain. Chronic pain is, as its
sufferers have known all along, painfully real. This section describes the
state of pain science and points toward the proposals for its legal
application that will be described in Parts III and IV.
A. Chronic Pain: An Overview
The myriad varieties of physical pain all fall into two categories: acute
or chronic. Acute pain is sudden in onset and relatively brief in duration.60
It follows the familiar nociceptive model: the body experiences an injury or
insult (a sprained ankle, a burst appendix); nerves in the affected area relay
signals to the spinal cord and brain; and the brain sends back the message
“pain!” This kind of pain is adaptive: It signals that the organism needs to
pay attention to something right now. Because acute pain is caused by
peripheral input to the spinal cord and brain, once the peripheral injury
58. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
DSM-IV-TR 446 (4th ed. rev. 2000).
59. Harold Merskey drove the change from DSM-III to DSM-IV. See Harold Merskey, Pain
Disorder, Hysteria or Somatization?, 9 PAIN RES. & MGMT. 67, 71 (2004).
60. K.P. Grichnik & F.M. Ferrante, The Difference Between Acute and Chronic Pain, 58 MT.
SINAI J. MED. 217 (1991).
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resolves, the pain goes away. Most physical pain is acute pain, and most
acute pain resolves relatively quickly.
Chronic pain is fundamentally different. Even though chronic pain is
typically defined as pain lasting three to six months or more,61 it is not just
long lasting acute pain. Rather, chronic pain often has “a life of its own”:62
it often does not depend on continued peripheral input. It may endure long
after any injury has healed, may be entirely out of proportion to the original
(sometimes trivial) injury, or may arise in the absence of any injury.
Many severe chronic pain disorders are “primary,” meaning the pain is
itself the disease; it does not derive from (is not “secondary to”) any other
condition or injury. Primary chronic pain conditions include some of the
most common sources of work absenteeism, doctor visits, and general
misery: chronic lower back pain and headache. While some chronic back
pain is traceable to mechanical issues like impinged nerves or spinal
abnormalities, most abnormal findings are merely incidental; correcting
bulging discs, for example, frequently does nothing to alleviate the pain.63
Similarly, most headache conditions are not symptoms of “something else,”
like a tumor or vascular abnormality. The abnormality is in the central
nervous system—a kind of “always on” setting in the brain or a
hypersensitivity to ordinary signals.
Other chronic pain syndromes may originate with a peripheral injury,
but the pain then “chronifies.” In pain chronification, the peripheral injury
heals or appears to heal completely but severe pain persists.64 Common
forms of chronified post-injury pain include post-surgical pain, complex
regional pain syndrome, and phantom limb pain. If a patient is fortunate,
his or her pain may be amenable to peripheral intervention.65 But for the
most part, interventions at the location where the person experiences the
pain make the pain worse, not better, because the brain itself is generating
the false sensation of local pain.66
Some chronically painful conditions, like irritable bowel syndrome or
advanced arthritis, are associated with ongoing peripheral disease. But
61. JUDY FOREMAN, A NATION IN PAIN: HEALING OUR BIGGEST HEALTH PROBLEM 3 (2014).
62. Peter Croft et al., Chronic Pain as a Topic for Epidemiology and Public Health, in CHRONIC
PAIN EPIDEMIOLOGY: FROM AETIOLOGY TO PUBLIC HEALTH 3, 5 (Peter Croft et al. eds, 2010).
63. Such pain may be managed or, in some patients, resolved; however, manipulations or
interventions in the back itself often have no impact on the pain condition.
64. David Borsook et al., Neuroimaging Revolutionizes Therapeutic Approaches to Chronic
Pain, 3 MOLECULAR PAIN art. no. 25, at 2 (2007).
65. A. Lee Dellon et al., Treatment of the Painful Neuroma by Neuroma Resection and Muscle
Implantation, 77 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 427, 434 (1986).
66. See, e.g., Ronald Melzack et al., Central Neuroplasticity and Pathological Pain, 933
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 157, 162–63 (2001) (discussing denervation hypersensitivity; reporting that
surgical nerve resection can lead to increased pain due to neuronal activity in the somatosensory
system). Cf. id. at 163–67 (noting that improved surgical techniques, including administration of local
anesthesia to nerves to be resected, may improve such outcomes).
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peripheral input causes only part of patients’ pain: Patients with these
conditions develop neurologically altered pain perception, leaving them
with both peripheral disease and a central pain-processing disorder.67
Chronic pain, whether primary or secondary, both causes and results
from a phenomenon called “central sensitization,” in which the brain
reorganizes its upward and downward modulation of pain signals.68 Over
time, over-activity in these neural regions reshapes the brain, a process
called “neuroplasticity.” Chronic pain sufferers develop atrophy and
hypertrophy in brain regions involved in pain signal transmission and in the
affective processing of pain.69 The longer a person suffers chronic pain, and
the more intense the pain, the greater the degree of volume loss (atrophy) is
observed in these brain regions. This time-dependent, pain-dependent
atrophy leads some researchers to speculate that chronic pain is a
neurodegenerative disease.70 Although the mechanisms underlying painrelated neuroplasticity remain under investigation, researchers agree that
chronic pain changes the brain and does so progressively over time.71
This model of chronic pain as a central nervous system disorder is quite
new. In Kuhnian fashion, it marks a paradigm shift away from the prior
peripheral injury model.72 It is puzzling that the peripheral injury model
endured for so long, in light of its general failure to explain the distress and
match the symptomatology of many forms of chronic pain. It may have
been able to endure so long because studies of the central nervous system
were not developed enough to provide an alternative account for the
symptoms doctors encountered. It also may have endured in part because
the theory of psychogenic pain, and background norms relating to hysteria,
allowed physicians to explain away apparently anomalous cases.73 The

67. Sean C. Mackey & Fumiko Maeda, Functional Imaging and the Neural Systems of Chronic
Pain, 15 NEUROSURGERY CLINICS N. AM. 269, 269–70 (2004) (identifying chronic low back pain,
irritable bowel syndrome, and complex regional pain syndrome as having significant centralized
involvement); see also Stephen E. Gwilym et al., Psychophysical and Functional Imaging Evidence
Supporting the Presence of Central Sensitization in a Cohort of Osteoarthritis Patients, 61 ARTHRITIS
CARE & RES. 1226 (2009).
68. See generally Melzack, supra note 66; see also Chronic Pain Medical Treatment Guidelines,
DEP’T
OF
INDUS.
REL.
3–4
(2009),
CAL.
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dwc/DWCPropRegs/MTUS_Regulations/MTUS_ChronicPainMedicalTreatment
Guidelines.pdf (“[C]hronic pain . . . involve[s] changes in central pain processing mediated through
mechanisms of neural plasticity and ultimately leading to hyper-excitability of central structures . . . .”).
69. Arne May, Chronic Pain May Change the Structure of the Brain, 137 PAIN 7, 8–9 (2008).
70. Borsook et al., supra note 64, at 2 (stating that chronic pain “must be considered as a chronic
degenerative disease . . . producing an altered brain state”) (citing A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic
Back Pain Is Associated with Decreased Pre-frontal and Thalamic Gray Matter Density, 24 J.
NEUROSCI. 46 (2004); A. Kuchinad et al., Accelerated Brain Gray Matter Loss in Fibromyalgia
Patients: Premature Aging of the Brain?, 27 J. NEUROSCI. 15 (2007)).
71. Melzack et al., supra note 66, at 167–69.
72. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 118 (3d ed. 1996).
73. See supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text.
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peripheral injury model required—to state the obvious—a causal peripheral
injury. When physicians found no injury or no relationship between a
peripheral injury and the complained-of pain, they came to the (apparently)
ineluctable conclusion that the patient’s pain resulted from no physical
cause.74 This conclusion, in turn, was buttressed by the readily-available
theories of hysteria and conversion.75
The contemporary model that gives priority to brain-based processes
may not be the last word in pain science, and the field continues to evolve;
but, it has vastly more explanatory and predictive power than the prior
model. The sections below detail particular neuroimaging technologies and
what they currently show (and cannot show) about chronic pain conditions.
B. Structural Neuroimaging Shows Changes in Pain Sufferers’ Brains
1. Overview of Structural Neuroimaging
Magnetic resonance imaging generates a three-dimensional, highly
detailed representation of hard- and soft-tissue bodily structures.76 MR
images can show whether there are structural abnormalities within the
imaged area; many readers will have direct experience of this through
having had an MRI of the knee or lower back. MR images also show the
volume of particular areas, allowing for the volume of the same structure to
be compared across subjects.
This volumetric comparison of different brain regions shown on an
MRI is performed using a mathematical technique known as “voxel-based
morphometry,” or VBM.77 Just as a flat screen is comprised of pixels,
locations within the three-dimensional MR-image space are designated by
volumetric pixels, called “voxels.”78 Standardizing a voxel map over brain
images allows researchers to compare the volumes of brain regions across
subjects or within one subject over time.79

74. Rollin M. Gallagher, Secondary Gain in Pain Medicine: Let Us Stick with Biobehavioral
Data, 3 J. PAIN 274, 274 (1994) (describing physicians’ tendency to fall back on explanations of
somatization and secondary gain, “[t]he concept behind the use of the term seemed simple: without a
known biomedical cause, the symptom must be psychiatric”).
75. See supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text.
76. Despite the verisimilitude of the MR image, an MR image is a computer-generated
composite constructed from data. DONALD W. MCROBBIE ET AL., MRI FROM PICTURE TO PROTON 1
(2003).
77. Arne May & Christian Gaser, Magnetic Resonance-Based Morphometry: A Window into
Structural Plasticity of the Brain, 19 CURRENT OPINION NEUROLOGY 407, 408 (2006).
78. Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with fMRI, 453 NATURE
869, 871 (2008).
79. The typical voxel in an MR brain image is about nine cubic millimeters. Id.
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Studying the shape and size of brain regions—the brain’s
“morphometry”—using voxel-based comparisons enables a range of
studies exploring the impact of various conditions on brain size and
structure.80 “Neuroplasticity”—the way the brain remodels itself response
to experience—has practically become a household word over the last
decade, in part because VBM can now show, noninvasively, how people’s
brain regions grow, shrink, or reorganize.81
2. Brain-Based Changes Reflect Duration, Severity, and Type of Pain
Three decades ago, Elaine Scarry famously wrote in The Body in Pain
that “physical pain” seems to have “no reality because it has not yet
manifested itself on the visible surface of the earth.”82 She described pain’s
invisibility as causing it to be “that which cannot be denied and [yet] that
which cannot be confirmed.”83 Structural neuroimaging now shows that
distinct chronic pain conditions produce characteristic patterns of structural
brain alteration, with the degree of visible brain alteration correlating with
the duration, severity, and kind of chronic pain. These findings lend reality
and specificity to chronic pain conditions: Although the sensation of pain
remains invisible, pain creates visible traces in the body. Through these
technologies, pain now is “visible [on the] surface of the earth”;84 it is now
“that which cannot be denied and that which cannot [can now] be
confirmed.”85
The groundbreaking work that first showed the relationship between
chronic pain and regional brain atrophy was conducted by Vania Apkarian,
a professor of neuroscience at Northwestern University. In 2004, Apkarian
showed that chronic back pain is associated with decreased grey matter
density in the prefrontal cortex and thalamus of the brain.86 The core
finding of this paper appeared to be: Chronic pain equals brain loss; more
pain equals more brain lost.87
Numerous prominent researchers have confirmed and extended these
findings. Professor Arne May, one of the world’s leading researchers on the
structural neuroimaging of headache pain, reports that VBM studies show
80. May & Gaser, supra note 77, at 407.
81. Id. at 408–09.
82. SCARRY, supra note 7, at 3–4.
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id. at 3.
85. Id. at 4 (alteration and emphasis added).
86. A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic Back Pain Is Associated with Decreased Prefrontal and
Thalamic Gray Matter Density, 24 J. NEUROSCIENCE 46 (2004).
87. See, e.g., A. Vania Apkarian et al., Pain and the Brain: Specificity and Plasticity of the Brain
in Clinical Chronic Pain, 152 PAIN S49, S55 (2011); Borsook et al., supra note 64, at 2 (stating chronic
pain “must be considered as a chronic degenerative disease”).
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significant changes in grey matter in patients with chronic headache,
chronic back pain, and phantom limb pain.88 The more grey matter a person
has lost, the more sensitive he or she becomes to pain.89 In a meta-review
of the burgeoning research on structural pain imaging, May reports that
chronic pain most frequently leads to atrophy in the frontal lobes, followed
by atrophy in the cingulate cortex and the insula.90 Similarly, David
Borsook, a Harvard-based pain researcher, has reported characteristic
structural, functional, and molecular changes in brain regions in patients
with chronic neuropathic pain, complex regional pain disorder, and
fibromyalgia.91 This ability to determine which parts of the brain are
compromised by specific chronic pain conditions “revolutionizes
therapeutic approaches to chronic pain” by helping achieve diagnostic
specificity and pointing toward neurological targets for intervention.92
C. Functional Neuroimaging in Chronic Pain
Distinct chronic pain conditions correlate with distinct structural brain
changes, as described above. Researchers are exploring whether particular
types of chronic pain correlate with specific functional patterns of activity
in sufferers’ brains. The answer, preliminarily, is yes: Functional
neuroimaging shows that different pain conditions are associated with
characteristic patterns of brain activity. This section introduces how
functional brain imaging works and then describes how functional imaging
studies contribute to understanding chronic pain disorders.
1. Overview of Functional Neuroimaging
The main technology for imaging the brain in pain is functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This revolutionary technology allows
researchers to glimpse and approximate in real time the activity of the brain
that corresponds to varied kinds of action and experience. Using fMRI,
researchers can start to understand which regions of the brain are involved

88. Arne May, Neuroimaging: Visualizing the Brain in Pain, 28 NEUROLOGICAL SCI. S101, S104
(2007).
89. Nichole M. Emerson et al., Pain Sensitivity Is Inversely Related to Regional Grey Matter
Density in the Brain, 155 PAIN 566 (2014).
90. Arne May, Structural Brain Imaging: A Window into Chronic Pain, 17 NEUROSCIENTIST
209, 212 (2011) [hereinafter May, Structural Brain Imaging]; see also Arne May, New Insights into
Headache: An Update on Functional and Structural Imaging Findings, 5 NATURE REVS. NEUROLOGY
199, 205 (2009) [hereinafter May, New Insights into Headache] (reporting volumetric changes in the
insula, brain stem, and hypothalamus as characteristic of various primary headache syndromes).
91. Borsook et al., supra note 64, at 4.
92. Id. at 1.
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in perceiving and experiencing acute pain, and in experiencing and
generating chronic pain.
fMRI works by indirectly indicating where the brain is using more
energy.93 The brain is constantly active, and certain regions of the brain
preferentially become active when a person engages in a particular task or
thought process.94 Usually, many regions become active together, because
the brain is a highly interconnected system.95 When brain regions become
more active, their metabolic demands go up: they need more oxygen and
glucose, which are delivered by increased blood flow.
When an MRI machine sends magnetic pulses through the subject’s
brain, it can detect these changes in blood flow.96 The magnetic pulses are
not distorted by oxygen-rich blood, but deoxygenated blood distorts the
magnetic wave slightly.97 This creates the “blood oxygenation leveldependent,” or BOLD, signal.98 Researchers generate a composite picture
of which regions in the brain show increased or decreased blood flow
during a task or experience.99 It is important to understand that fMRI is not
a photograph of brain activity. Instead, it is like looking at a map of where
a city uses energy, which can indicate where the city is bustling and where
it is sleepy.
In investigating acute pain and chronic pain conditions, fMRI has
proven revelatory. Irene Tracey, an Oxford University-based scientist, was
the first to use fMRI to image the brain in pain. She has shown not only
which regions of the brain process acute pain, but also that subjective selfreports of acute pain correlate with the degree of activity in the subjects’
brains.100 That is, the phenomenology of pain matches the physiological
degree of response to pain, a fascinating empirical contribution to
philosophical debates on perception. Researchers have used fMRI to show
functional brain reorganization in patients with chronic pain,101 and have

93. See, e.g., Nikos K. Logothetis, The Underpinnings of the BOLD Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Signal, 23 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3963, 3963 (2003).
94. Id.
95. John T. Cacioppo et al., Just Because You’re Imaging the Brain Doesn’t Mean You Can Stop
Using Your Head: A Primer and Set of First Principles, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 650, 651
(2003); see also, e.g., Matthew Brett et al., The Problem of Functional Localization in the Human
Brain, 3 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 243, 243 (2002) (detailing problems with using fMRI to
localize complex and interconnected brain functions).
96. John A. Detre, Clinical Applicability of Functional MRI, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE
IMAGING 808, 808–09 (2006).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 809.
100. Irene Tracey & Patrick W. Mantyh, The Cerebral Signature for Pain Perception and its
Modulation, 55 NEURON 377, 383 (2007).
101. May, supra note 88, at S104–05 (showing functional reorganization in headache
syndromes; degree of reorganization correlates with degree of pain and impairment).
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even shown that particular types of functional reorganization are
characteristic of distinct chronic pain conditions.102
fMRI has important limitations, however. First, it has temporal
limitations: Blood flow may precede neural activity—or it may lag
behind.103 Spatially, the signal from blood vessels may not be precisely
where the neural activity is taking place.104 Third, there is a great deal of
normal variation in brain response in a single subject (person) across
different trials, and lots of variation between subjects.105 An fMRI showing
the response to a particular stimulus like pain is an average—an average of
many trials of one subject and an average of many trials across different
subjects. The composite fMRI showing what “the brain” does in response
to, say, a painful heat stimulus may not look exactly like any single scan of
any subject’s brain in that experiment.106
2. fMRI as Objective Measure of Pain?
When fMRI studies have created a robust composite of average brain
activity in response to a particular stimulus (say, acute pain), then
researchers can use software to compare an individual brain scan to the
composite and make an educated guess about whether the individual is
experiencing the same thing.107 Could fMRI pattern classification provide a
“pain-o-meter” to help legal actors improve trial outcomes and better
manage systems at risk for fraud?
A team of researchers led by Sean Mackey at Stanford University have
developed an fMRI protocol that can determine in most cases whether a
subject in an fMRI scanner is experiencing acute pain.108 In a paper
tantalizingly entitled, Towards a Physiology-Based Measure of Pain:
Patterns of Human Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful
Thermal Stimulation, the authors assert that their findings demonstrate that
fMRI “can assess pain without requiring any communication from the

102. May, Structural Brain Imaging, supra note 90, at 211, Figure 2 (reporting functional
imaging findings of headache syndromes; showing distinct brain regions become active during pain
attacks in the various syndromes).
103. Nikos K. Logothetis & Josef Pfeuffer, On the Nature of the BOLD fMRI Contrast
Mechanism, 22 MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 1517, 1524 (2004).
104. Id.
105. Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the
Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 275 (2007).
106. Id.
107. Justin E. Brown et al., Towards a Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: Patterns of Human
Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful Thermal Stimulation, 6 PLOS ONE e24124, at 2
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0024124 (describing
machine learning paradigm, developed in the Mackey lab at Stanford).
108. Id. at 7.
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person being tested.”109 This work has been refined and extended by Tor
Wager, whose recent work in the New England Journal of Medicine
showed that fMRI could detect acute pain in normal, healthy subjects with
ninety-five percent accuracy.110
This major research accomplishment looks like a pain-o-meter, but it is
not.111 Even if this protocol worked perfectly in predicting acute pain (and
it currently has a relatively high rate of error), it would be of limited use
relative to chronic pain, as these conditions present themselves very
differently neurologically. Further, acute pain can be produced in the lab;
chronic pain may or may not be present—and may be present at varying
intensities—at the time of a test. Apart from pain detection, though, fMRI
can detect changes in the “default-mode network,” or patterns of
background activity, of chronic pain sufferers’ brains.112 This finding helps
explain perceptual, cognitive, and affective impairments that occur in these
conditions.113 Perhaps in the future, fMRI of the default network may have
diagnostic potential, helping categorize patients, plaintiffs, or claimants.
III. NEUROIMAGING SHOULD INFLUENCE DOCTRINE AND INTERPRETATION
IN DISABILITY LAW
The new science of chronic pain, particularly neuroimaging of chronic
pain, should lead to modifications to the Social Security Disability
regulations and, in the near term, to judicial reinterpretation of the existing
regulations. This Part first presents the SSDI regulations and the 1984
Amendment to those regulations, which were intended to provide
adjudicators with greater guidance on how to evaluate claims grounded in
chronic pain.
While regulatory reform may proceed slowly, federal judicial
interpretation of the existing regulations could evolve without delay to
incorporate new scientific knowledge. After exploring the regulations, this
section turns to how judges in different circuits interpret and apply the
SSDI regulations. Judicial interpretations vary considerably from circuit to
circuit, incorporating a range of understandings of chronic pain—some of
which are loose and unbounded, while others are unrealistically narrow and

109. Id. at 1.
110. Tor Wager et al., An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1388, 1388 (2013).
111. Brown et al., supra note 107, at 5 (“We are still very far from a physiology-based pain
assessment tool that could be used in clinical, forensic, and other applied settings.”).
112. Marwan N. Baliki et al., Beyond Feeling: Chronic Pain Hurts the Brain, Disrupting the
Default-Mode Network Dynamics, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 1398 (2008) (using fMRI to show defaultmode network changes in chronic pain).
113. Id.
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restrictive. The variability not only fails to comport with pain science but
violates horizontal equity, as similarly-situated claimants may receive
different outcomes depending only on the circuit in which their cases
proceed. And, it imposes costs on the system: Circuits that use an underdefined standard may increase the likelihood of fraud and abuse, while
those that use a harsh and unrealistic standard may frustrate the purposes of
the Act. This Part proposes ways in which judicial interpretation of the
existing regulations ought to change to incorporate new scientific
knowledge about chronic pain.
A. Social Security Disability Doctrine and Practice Relating to Chronic
Pain
Disability, under the Social Security Disability Insurance program
(SSDI), often turns crucially on pain—whether the claimant is in pain, and
whether that pain is intense, constant, and traceable to an objectively
identifiable medical condition.114 Although only about one in five Social
Security claimants receives benefits pursuant to the Disability program,
determining whether claimants in fact are disabled “now constitutes the
major part of [the SSA’s] workload.”115 The SSA receives about 600,000
hearing requests annually, a large percentage of which involve claims of
chronic pain.116
Yet, the disability law regime has struggled with the problem of pain
since its inception. Despite its prominence as a cause of disability, “chronic
pain” is not defined within the Social Security Administration’s
regulations. As a result of the Act’s silence on pain, early cases litigated
under the Act held as a matter of law that pain could not be disabling.117
This principle changed in 1961, when the Fifth Circuit held in Butler v.
Flemming that chronic pain could constitute a disability under the Act.118
The Butler principle spread rapidly; eventually, every circuit recognized
that pain could render a person disabled within the meaning of the Act.119

114. See Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)
(2012).
115. Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed. Reg.
16,424, 16,424 (Mar. 31, 2006) (emphasis added); see also Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social
Policy, and Social Security’s Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 189,
191 (2007) (describing the toll on administrative resources of adjudicating disability claims).
116. Bloch, supra note 115, at 192 (providing figures).
117. See, e.g., Adams v. Flemming, 276 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1960); Coomes v. Ribicoff, 209
F. Supp. 670, 672 (D. Kan. 1962); Littleton v. Ribicoff, 210 F. Supp. 711, 714 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
118. 288 F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1961).
119. I.J. Schiffres, Pain as “Disability” Entitling Insured to Disability Benefits Under § 103 of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 423), 23 A.L.R.3d 1034, § 5[b] (2014) (describing Butler
precedent; collecting cases).
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Such pain must arise from a “medically determinable physical or mental
impairment.”120
This double-edged recognition of pain as disabling, but only when it
arises from a distinct or determinable impairment, endures today. Chronic
pain cannot serve as a valid category of disability unless the pain is caused
by some condition separate from the pain itself—such as rheumatoid or
osteoarthritis giving rise to pain, or back injury giving rise to pain, and so
forth. Claimants who cannot point to a known medical condition capable of
giving rise to pain cannot be found disabled based on pain—with one
exception. That exception is psychogenic or somatized pain.
Since the disability regime’s inception, the drafters of the disability
regulations and the judges who interpret them have recognized that
disabling pain does frequently occur independently of a disabling injury or
obvious disease. To provide compensation to claimants who appeared to
demonstrate genuine suffering but who could not show evidence of a
distinct injury or disease, ALJs and federal judges arrived at the workaround of finding such claimants psychiatrically disabled. Claimants with
chronic pain thus could qualify as disabled if they could receive a diagnosis
and a finding of a psychiatric pain condition, generally either psychogenic
pain, “somatoform pain disorder,” or “conversion disorder.” This allows
for financial recovery in some cases. However, it also reinforces the notion
that chronic pain is hysterically generated—and it affords no recovery to
people suffering from chronic pain who do not also demonstrate the
symptoms necessary for a suitable psychiatric disorder. The rest of this
section explores in detail these issues under the regulations.
1. Legal Framework: Statutory and Regulatory Regime
Under the Social Security Disability Act (the Act), disability insurance
(DI) is available to any person with a “disability” who is an “insured”
under the Act and who is under the age of 65.121 Similarly, under the Social
Security Insurance (SSI) program established in the same Act, benefits are
available to people who are both indigent and disabled. The Act defines
disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.”122
The impairment, further, must “be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.”123
120.
121.
122.
123.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012).
§ 423(a)(1).
§ 423(d)(1)(A).
Id.
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Within the meaning of the Social Security Act, a condition (like pain)
can be “disabling” if it results from “a medical impairment” that could
“reasonably be expected” to cause the kind and degree of impairment
alleged.124 Medical proof is built into the statutory regime: The claimant
must provide “[o]bjective medical evidence”125 showing a “medically
determinable” impairment,126 and the associated disability must “result[]
from anatomical [or] physiological . . . abnormalities” that are
“demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.”127 The Act is implemented through federal regulations that
require a claimant to provide objective evidence of a condition, “which
could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged.”128
Neither the Act nor its implementing regulations define disabling pain
nor list disabling pain conditions.129 In the absence of such guidance,
administrative and Article III courts have struggled over time to determine
how to adjudicate an increasing caseload of pain-based claims. Courts have
found particularly challenging the subjective and variable nature of chronic
pain, as well as claimants’ assertions that they suffer chronic pain in the
absence of an obvious, ongoing injury.130
2. The Problematic 1984 Regulations: Pain as Symptom of
“Something Else”
As a result of ongoing judicial confusion and inconsistency, Congress
revisited the question of DI/SSI pain evaluation guidelines in the early
1980s.131 In 1984, Congress issued new guidelines amending the Act that
ostensibly instructed courts how to proceed in evaluating chronic pain
claims.132 The 1984 Amendment lays out a three-part inquiry, codified and
elaborated in SSA regulations. Under the Amendment and the regulations
124. § 423(d)(5)(A).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. § 423(d)(3).
128. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (2014); see also § 416.929(b).
129. Schiffres, supra note 119, § 5[b]. As a result of the Act’s silence, early decisions under the
Act held that pain could not be disabling. Id. (collecting cases).
130. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN 26 (1987) (discussing congressional action, noting and
describing “the diversity of court rulings” on this point); see also, e.g., Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270
F.3d 715, 721–23 (8th Cir. 2001) (reversing ALJ’s finding that the record did not corroborate subjective
complaints of pain); see also Schiffres, supra note 119, § 9 (discussing how the trier of facts should
evaluate subjective pain).
131. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 130, at 26.
132. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)
(2012).
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derived from it, the claimant first must show by “by medically
acceptable . . . diagnostic techniques” that he suffers a “medical
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities.”133 This showing of medical causation is “a threshold
requirement; a sine qua non” of any valid claim.134 Second, the fact finder
must determine that the abnormalities could “reasonably be expected to
produce the pain” to the degree complained of.135 If the pain is more severe
or longer lasting than would be typical for the underlying impairment, then
the ALJ is instructed to examine other evidence bearing on the degree of
the claimant’s pain and his resulting impairment. Third and finally, the
medically-demonstrable pain must reasonably “lead to a conclusion that the
individual is under a disability,”136 meaning that the pain must preclude the
claimant from engaging in “any substantial gainful activity.”137
The Amendment and related regulations attempt to define when pain is
legally disabling. Yet, when read narrowly, these provisions do not define
pain as a legally disabling condition at all. Rather, the SSA recognizes as
disabling any underlying medical impairments that reasonably and actually
cause severe pain, not pain itself. The first step of the inquiry is a threshold
showing of some “anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalit[y],” and the second step is the determination of whether such
abnormality could be “reasonably [] expected to produce the pain.”138 Pain
is thus conceived of as the output of the disease state or abnormal
condition. Thus, under the Act, pain cannot itself be the basis of a claim of
disability.
This distinction between pain as a symptom versus pain as a disease in
itself might seem recondite. But it has enormous importance: The Act
perpetuates the conception of pain-as-symptom, pain as derivative. Instead,
as discussed in Part II, chronic pain often is a disease in itself. Chronic pain
without lesion may be associated with abnormal biomarkers and brain
states, yet currently there is no known cause for many chronic pain
conditions or for why apparently healed peripheral injury can continue to
be associated with pain. This matters legally because it means that chronic

133. Id.
134. Bloch, supra note 115, at 234 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a)); see also, e.g.,
Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted) (stating that the initial consideration must be whether there is “objective medical evidence of
an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain”); Johnson v.
Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 657 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating the same).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); see also SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 130, at
14.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).
137. § 423(d)(1)(A).
138. § 423(d)(5)(A).
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pain often is not—as required by the Act—demonstrably the product of
another impairment or condition.
If under the guidelines the pain must be “produced by” another
condition, then adjudicators face the problem of seemingly uncaused
chronic pain, where the suffering is obvious but its sources are not. Many
judges have tried to interpret the requirement that pain arise from another
condition generously, so that it comports with their general intuition that
chronic pain can be real in the absence of an evident injury or with their
particular assessment of a claimant as sincere in his or her suffering.139
What judges have fallen back upon in the absence of a convincing
mechanism to explain chronic pain has been the notion that chronic pain is
a real disorder, but of psychiatric origin.140
Following the 1984 amendments, many judges started to do what some
handful of them had done before: find that claimants are disabled by
“psychogenic pain” or by the closely related psychiatric diagnosis of
“somatoform pain disorder” (SPD), the modern heir to the old diagnosis of
hysteria.141 Psychogenic pain and SPD have been the savior and the
nemesis of chronic pain claimants: savior, because these diagnoses
provides legal and medical recognition and financial compensation for
unexplained pain; nemesis, because shoe-horning chronic pain into these
psychiatric diagnoses carries several negative consequences. First, the
claimant has to meet the burden of producing convincing evidence of
psychogenic pain or SPD, which he may not be able to offer if his
condition is not psychiatric in origin. Second, a claimant’s categorization as
suffering from psychiatric pain may limit his or her access to medical
interventions that would be contraindicated for psychiatric pain. Treatment
flows from diagnosis: If the diagnosis is that a person’s chronic pain arises
from repressed emotion, then an insurer might reimburse comparatively
inexpensive psychiatric medication but might deny coverage for
interventional procedures like nerve blocks. Finally, if the claimant is
successful, he or she then labors not only under the disability of pain but
also the stigma of a psychiatric diagnosis.
B. Improving SSDI Regulations with New Pain Science
Although a claimant need not provide courts with “objective evidence
of pain,” she must (reasonably enough) provide “objective evidence of a

139. See, e.g., Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 754–55 (7th Cir. 2004).
140. See, e.g., Davis v. Califano, 599 F.2d 1324, 1326–27 (5th Cir. 1979) (remanding for further
factfinding to determine if the claimant’s pain was “psychosomatic”).
141. See, e.g., Sanders v. Sullivan, 983 F. 2d 822 (8th Cir. 1992); Farris v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 773 F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1985).
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medical condition which could cause the pain alleged.”142 Yet, if current
descriptions of pain chronification mechanisms are accurate, then much
chronic pain will occur in the absence of any separate or distinct
“condition” that “produce[s] the pain,” other than the chronic pain
condition itself.143 At least as currently discernible by medical science,
there may be no obvious anatomical abnormality, no peripheral smoking
gun.
It sounds circular to say that pain is the symptom of the disease of pain,
which reasonably can be expected to produce pain. But the appearance of
circularity is merely semantic. It disappears if the relationship between the
experience of pain and the condition giving rise to it is reconceptualized
like this: Chronic pain may be produced and maintained by neurological
alterations, which modify the brain’s functional patterns and structure. This
type of central nervous system sensitization may arise in conjunction with a
peripheral injury or disease; it may endure after a peripheral injury heals; or
it may arise in the absence of any peripheral cause, as with primary
headache syndromes.144
To bring the regulations in line with the current state of medical
knowledge about pain chronification, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b) and
404.1529(b) should be amended to recognize that chronic pain can persist
after an initial trauma, injury, or disease has actually or apparently
resolved. There are several ways that this amendment could be
implemented. I suggest that the language of the regulations be amended to
read: “objective evidence of a medical condition, including chronic pain
conditions, that could cause the pain alleged . . . .” This language would
incorporate into the regulations the reality that chronic pain is a medical
condition—a neurological disorder of diverse etiology but fairly uniform
mechanism—characterized by abnormal activation of areas of the brain
related to pain perception and generally independent of any peripheral
input.
Alternatively, the language of the regulations could remain as it is, but
an advisory committee or other body within the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) could promulgate an interpretive memorandum
that defines chronic pain as an independent medical condition that satisfies
the definition set forth in the regulations. This memorandum should
communicate the contemporary medical-scientific model of chronic pain as
involving both peripheral and central nervous system alterations in pain
transmission and perception. It should emphasize that such central nervous
system sensitization may arise in conjunction with a peripheral injury or
142. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594 (4th Cir. 1996).
143. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b), 404.1529(b) (2013).
144. See supra Part II.B, notes 86–92 (describing pain conditions).
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disease or in the absence of a peripheral cause. This is consistent with the
requirement that claims be supported by objective medical evidence, as
numerous diagnostic tests and criteria exist for the medical diagnosis of
chronic pain conditions.
C. Revising Judge-Made Disability Standards in Light of New Pain
Science
To account for contemporary pain science, the ways judges adjudicate
disability cases at the administrative and federal level similarly must evolve
in concert with amendments to the regulations or independently. The
regulations functionally may be changed through new judicial
interpretations: Courts have the authority to recognize medical evidence
that chronic pain can be an independent and distinct medical condition
under the regulations as they currently exist. In this way, courts could
simply incorporate evidence of pain chronification as a distinct
neurological disorder into the existing disability framework that requires
objective evidence of a medical condition that reasonably could lead to the
degree of pain alleged.
This avenue of constructive judicial amendment of the regulations is
attractive because it does not require time-consuming administrative or
legislative action. However, it ought to be a second-line alternative to
revision of the regulations: It relies on diffuse bodies, ALJs and Article III
judges, independently becoming aware of contemporary pain science and
then crafting appropriate interpretive and evidentiary standards. Given the
range of cases that judges must handle on a daily basis, it is not realistic to
expect that more than a few of them will come to the scientific literature on
their own and develop new standards. Moreover, district court judges, who
are the more likely sources of innovation, are constrained by the standards
already established by the appellate courts of their circuits. However, until
SSA does act on this—and recall that SSA has been stalled since 1984—
individual judges may use their courtrooms as “laboratories of
innovation.”145
This short section first describes the different and conflicting judgemade standards that circuits employ to interpret the SSDI regulations.
These varying standards reflect a continuum from leniency to harshness,
yet none reflects contemporary pain science. These varying standards also
lead to radically different outcomes for similarly-situated claimants. After
exploring the case law, this section suggests how courts could use pain
science to revise their circuits’ interpretations of these regulations.
145. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(popularizing the idea that the fifty states serve as “laboratories of democracy”).
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1. Judge-Made Disability Law and Its Vagaries
Even though ALJs and federal courts continue to engage faithfully in
the regulations’ prescribed inquiries, they reach wildly divergent
conclusions and have established inconsistent standards across federal
circuits. Courts do share a basic consensus that pain must be severe to
qualify as disabling; also, they agree that a person is not disabled merely
because he or she cannot work pain-free. Beyond that foundation, courts
across the United States apply three quite distinct pain evaluation
standards. Although the courts that articulate these standards all cite the
SSA regulation, nothing in that regulation sets forth any one of the
elements of these requirements, much less all of them. These inconsistent
and often vague standards leave adjudicators in the position of needing to
fall back on their personal judgment about what pain looks like and whose
pain they believe to be real.
The most permissive standard provides that, to be disabled by pain, a
claimant may be capable of gainful employment but that engaging in such
employment would cause the claimant “great pain.”146 This is a minority
standard, perhaps because it is in some tension with the SSD regulation
providing that a claimant must be incapable of performing any “substantial
gainful activity.”147
Courts in a majority of jurisdictions apply an intermediate standard.
This standard provides that a person’s pain must be so severe as to preclude
gainful employment entirely, rendering work impossible.148 Under this
standard, a person who would experience “great pain” from his or her work
duties, but who was not entirely “preclude[d]” from performing them,
would not qualify as disabled.149
The most draconian pain standard is that developed by the Fifth
Circuit. According to the case law of that circuit, to qualify as disabling,
pain must not only preclude the claimant from any significant gainful
employment; it also must be “constant, unremitting, and wholly
unresponsive to therapeutic treatment.”150 This standard is not grounded in
146. See, e.g., Musto v. Halter, 135 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D. Mass. 2001); Williams v. Halter, 135 F.
Supp. 2d 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Morin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. 835 F. Supp. 1414 (D. N.H.
1992).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012).
148. Courts in the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have used the
impossibility standard, although not uniformly. See, e.g., House v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1994);
Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1993); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1992);
Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1982);
McCaskill ex rel. Harris v. Massanari, 152 F. Supp. 2d 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Rajt v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 859 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
149. See Smith, 671 F.2d at 794 n.6; Hargis, 945 F.2d at 1489.
150. Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (establishing this standard in the Fifth
Circuit) (emphasis added).
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the language or substance of any disability statutes or regulations and is
flatly contrary to the biology of chronic pain diseases. Chronic pain
conditions remit and relapse. Many people with lifelong chronic pain
conditions may have pain-free days. A person also may have pain every
day, but the level of pain will vary from day to day, and often from
morning to night.151 Indeed, a claim that one’s pain is absolutely invariable
is more likely to be a marker of an inartfully fabricated claim than of an
actual chronic pain condition. Moreover, fortunately, almost all chronic
pain conditions can be at least partially treated, whether interventionally,
pharmacologically, or behaviorally. Thus, this standard’s requirement that
the condition be “wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” is as
misguided as its insistence that the pain be constant in its level.152
It is ironic that a judicial interpretation of the disability regulations,
perhaps inspired by judges’ desire to reduce fraudulent claims, instead
would articulate criteria more likely to reward the fraudster than the
legitimate claimant, while enshrining the notion that claimants who do not
meet this fictitious characterization of pain are frauds. This problemfraught standard might be of limited interest beyond the Fifth Circuit,
except that it is spreading to federal courts in the Second, Third, Sixth,
Seventh, and Eight Circuits, as well as to some ALJs.153 Because of its
legal significance and the instructive depth of its manifold error, it is worth
analyzing this standard and its history closely.
The story of this standard dates back forty years to an opinion issued
by an ALJ against claimant Chaney, holding he was not disabled because
he did not have any “significant signs” consistent with chronic pain.154
Chaney appealed and, in Chaney v. Califano, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.155
In considering the ALJ’s finding that the claimant was not disabled, the
court quoted the ALJ’s statement that:
[P]ain is a subjective symptom that is not measurable, and it is
recognized that there are many disorders in which . . . pain . . . is
constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic
measures. Generally, when an individual has suffered severe pain

151. Variability in pain level is highly characteristic of chronic pain conditions. Jennifer M. Foss
et al., Dynamics of Pain: Fractal Dimension of Temporal Variability of Spontaneous Pain
Differentiates Between Pain States, 95 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 730 (2006) (finding that fluctuations in
pain level are characteristic neurobiological features of different chronic pain conditions); see also A.
Vania Apkarian et al., Towards a Theory of Chronic Pain, 87 PROGRESS IN NEUROBIOLOGY 81 (2009)
(describing neurological bases of pain variation in chronic pain conditions).
152. Hames, 707 F.2d at 166.
153. See generally Torres-Rosas v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 420, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Summers v.
Colvin, No. 12CV22WMC, 2013 WL 6564451, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 13, 2013).
154. Chaney v. Califano, 588 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1979).
155. Id.
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for a long time, there are observable signs. . . . In the instant case,
there are no such significant signs or circumstances.156
Highlighting this language from the ALJ’s opinion, the court in Chaney
did not hold against the claimant because his pain was not “constant,
unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic measures.”157 Nor did
it state that only pain rising to that level constitutes statutory disability.
Rather, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling against Chaney because
he showed “no . . . significant signs” of suffering “severe pain for a long
time.”158 The disability standard the ALJ actually employed, and that
adopted by the circuit, was simply “severe pain for a long time,” not pain
“constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic measures.”
Effectively, the court held quite reasonably and unremarkably that a
disability claim must be supported by evidence of the disability.
Yet several years later, in Hames v. Heckler, a different panel of the
circuit seized on that dicta from Chaney to hold that “[p]ain, in and of itself
has been recognized as a disabling condition under the Act, but only where
it is constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic
treatment.”159 Heckler thus established in the Fifth Circuit a pain evaluation
standard that is: (1) not present in the Act or any of the SSA’s regulations,
(2) based on an apparent misreading of the circuit’s own prior case law,
and (3) wholly inconsistent with the biology of chronic pain.160
More than one-third of other circuit courts now employ the Fifth
Circuit’s standard in some cases.161 Although none of these circuits has
adopted the standard across the board, each employs it selectively. Courts’
selective use of this harsh and restrictive standard in some cases, but not in
others, could result from any variety of factors from judges’ beliefs about
the appropriate scope of social programs to variable research quality among
law clerks. It may also reflect judges’ personal responses to a claimant, or
type of pain syndrome, or a general skepticism toward pain claimants.
2. Normative Dimensions of Judge-Made Standards
The Seventh Circuit case Carradine v. Barnhart is just one case of
many that illuminates the normative, rather than doctrinal or medical,
values that play into mobilizing the “constant, unremitting, and totally
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
160. See supra, Part II.A.
161. See Torres-Rosas v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Summers v. Colvin, No.
12CV22WMC, 2013 WL 6564451 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 13, 2013).
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unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” standard.162 In Carradine, a panel of
the Seventh Circuit reversed the finding of the ALJ that the claimant was
not disabled due to chronic back pain.163 The plaintiff had endured several
spinal surgeries, had a morphine pump implanted in her spine, and had
severely curtailed her daily activities, but reported that she occasionally
could take short walks or do some shopping.164 She did not have a history
of mental illness.165 However, she lacked evidence of spinal abnormality or
other visible causes of the alleged severe chronic pain.166
Working within the constraints imposed by the regulations that a
claimant cannot be disabled due to chronic pain without providing evidence
of an objective medical condition that could produce the pain, Judge Posner
penned a majority opinion finding Carradine disabled due to psychogenic
pain, “somatoform pain disorder.”167 Carradine’s case presented no
evidence of psychiatric disability independent of her persistent back
pain.168 Yet, because Carradine did not have evidence of gross
abnormalities or a disease independent of back pain itself, the court was
constrained by the regulations either to find that she was not disabled or
that Carradine’s disability originated in a psychiatric disorder. Crediting the
record that Carradine had endured risky and painful surgeries to find relief
from her pain and that she increasingly withdrew from pleasurable life
activities, the majority was unwilling to find that she was not both
experiencing pain and disabled by it.169 Accordingly, it crafted a remedy
through relying on the psychiatric diagnosis available under the
regulations.
The majority holding engendered a blistering dissent, written almost
entirely in italics with bold for emphasis, mobilizing the “constant,
unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” standard.170
What makes the dissent remarkable beyond its typography is that it baldly
asserts that chronic pain in the absence of evident peripheral injury simply
does not exist—and that any claim to the contrary is pure fakery. The
dissent berates the majority for failing to apply the “constant, unremitting,
and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” standard.171 It notes that
Carradine admitted that, on good days, she could take a short walk with her

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 756.
Id. at 755–56.
Id. at 761 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
Id. at 760.
Id. at 756 (majority opinion).
Contra id. at 760 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
Id. at 755–56 (majority opinion).
Id. at 762 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
Id.
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daughter; this, the dissent emphasizes, shows that the pain is not “constant
and unremitting” and, therefore, not disabling.172 It goes on to assert that
any pain without a clear peripheral cause, like Mrs. Carradine’s back pain,
is either imagined or faked.173
While the majority employs the psychiatric route as a way to
compensate a claimant, the dissent argues the reverse: that people with
psychogenic pain should not be rewarded.174 Such rewards, the dissent
argues, just encourages what is, in effect, bad behavior—like giving a child
an ice cream for a temper tantrum. In this manner, the dissent reinforces the
stereotype that chronic pain patients are self-indulgent malingerers or
hysterics and that the only remedy they deserve is the sharp admonition to
snap out of it.
The Carradine dissent is exemplary in tipping its normative hand: An
adjudicator in the Fifth Circuit would be constrained to apply this standard,
which is part of that jurisdiction’s precedent. Yet, in jurisdictions like the
Seventh Circuit, where this standard is uncommon, an adjudicator must
make an affirmative choice to adopt it as an expression of a negative
perception of pain-based disability. Further, although the Carradine dissent
stands out in its vitriol toward the claimant and chronic pain claimants
generally, it is not substantively an aberration. Certain judges across the
country selectively apply the “constant, unremitting, and wholly
unresponsive” standard, and two lower courts have held consistently with
this appellate dissent.175
Ironically, the majority’s need to rely on the psychiatric diagnosis to
support its disability finding feeds into the very stereotypes that animate the
dissent. The majority, however, took this route because it was constrained
by the regulations to find a psychiatric cause of disability. This means that
the regulations themselves, in their attempt to provide a compensable
category of disability for chronic pain without lesion through the
somatoform diagnosis, undermine their purpose by misdescribing many
chronic pain syndromes and by marginalizing chronic pain sufferers as
mentally ill. Perhaps with greater medical knowledge and objective proof
of the mechanisms that cause chronic pain, prevalent norms of skepticism
and hostility toward chronic pain claimants can be supplanted.

172. Id. at 772 n.19.
173. Id. at 771.
174. See id. at 764.
175. See Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1126 (7th Cir. 2014); Ormon v. Astrue, 497 F. App’x.
81 (1st Cir. 2012); Goodhart v. Astrue, No. 4:08CV82ASAPR, 2009 WL 1952019, at *5 (N.D. Ind. July
6, 2009).
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IV. NEUROIMAGING SHOULD CHANGE “SOFT” AND “HARD” EVIDENTIARY
PRACTICES
This Part explores neuroimaging evidence in light of the “hard” and
“soft” practices of evidence law—that is, relative to the text of the rules as
well as in light of the arguably more important norms and expectations that
decision makers use to give content and meaning to those rules. These
norms and expectations shape not only judges’ evidentiary calls but also
their statutory interpretation practices and, thus, the creation of doctrine.
This section will argue that neuroimaging currently ought to have some
impact on both hard and soft practices, but far more on the latter.
Evidence practice at trial consists of more than the application of the
rules; it embraces the narrative character of the trial and extends to the
evaluative process of judges and juries. These “soft” practices shape the
trial process from the earliest stages of case building through to the
appellate process, as decision makers at each stage evaluate evidentiary
relevance, weight, and prejudice in light of their cultural and narrative
expectations. Partly rooted in fear of fraud, partly in Freudian
misconceptions of “hysteria,” soft practices of evidence relating to pain
claimants may reflect entrenched biases. Judges and juries’ norms and
expectations about chronic pain claimants and about the type of evidence
required to make the claims credible should and likely will change in light
of the new neuroscientific model of chronic pain.
Neuroimaging evidence likely will find its way into the “hard”
practices of evidence. In some cases, it likely will be appropriate to admit
some neuroimaging studies of chronic pain into evidence under the federal
and state evidence rules. Aggregate data about the average impact of pain
conditions can inform doctrines relating to pain claims and expectations
about the likely presentation and life course of a typical pain sufferer.
Currently, however, neuroimaging should not be introduced to support or
attack an individual’s claim relating to chronic pain.176 This is because of
certain limitations of neuroimaging technologies and the medical
variability of chronic pain conditions.
This Part will look first at how “soft” evidentiary practices may be
shifted by pain neuroimaging. It explores several evidentiary theories to
explain how existing background expectations—whether called narratives,
scripts, or another of the myriad terms scholars use for like phenomena—
about chronic pain distort the legal process. It offers specific suggestions
for how new scientific models can change social and legal constructions in
this arena, thus affecting evidence admissibility and weight and, ultimately,
the outcomes of cases. It then turns to “hard” evidence practices,
176. See infra Part V.B.
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considering how pain neuroimaging evidence should be evaluated under
federal, state, and administrative evidence regimes. It concludes that pain
neuroimaging and related research ought to be admissible in appropriate
cases at the aggregate level but not to prove pain in any individual case.
A. “Soft” Evidentiary Practices Shape the Litigation Process
1. Narrative, Norms, and the Meaning of Proof: The Soft Side of
Evidence Law
The kind and degree of proof that satisfies a reasonable person relates
to his or her understanding of the nature of the problem under
consideration. Claims about expected or common events seem relatively
plausible; these might be called “confirming” claims because they agree
with the average decision maker’s lived experience and expectations.
Claims about rare or unexpected events, conversely, invite relative
skepticism; these might be called “confounding” claims because they
confound the average decision maker’s experience, expectations, or beliefs.
Confirming claims require less, and less specialized, evidence than
confounding claims, which may require extraordinary proof or even strike
the relevant decision maker as unprovable.
Chronic pain presents confounding claims because most decision
makers have little direct experience of such conditions; further, they are
likely to hold common but mistaken beliefs about chronic pain’s causes,
presentation, and persistence. Indeed, there is active disinformation about
chronic pain; a dominant cultural narrative depicts chronic pain conditions
as expressions of neurosis or hysteria, and legal doctrines, like those in
disability law, directly incorporate this narrative into law.
Whether a claim is confirming or confounding—whether it accords
with background norms and expectations—has implications for the entire
legal process and for evidence law in particular. Evidence scholarship must
attend not only to the ways in which background expectations generally
influence the fact-finding process but to instances where specific,
erroneous expectations distort the legal process. These distortions can
affect evidence admissibility determinations, the degree of weight that
decision makers give to admitted evidence, the ways in which decision
makers evaluate evidence against the relevant legal standard, and the
conclusions that they reach in the matter.177

177. Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 315 (2013) (noting that
background expectations or narrative assumptions present “procedural issues from end to end in the
process of adjudication”).
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The role of cultural expectations and scripts, or “narratives,” is central
to numerous theories of evidence law and, indeed, to theories of the
construction of law itself. Preeminent legal scholars of the latter part of the
twentieth century, like Robert Cover, put narrative at the center of the legal
academy’s agenda with articles like Nomos and Narrative, in which he
argued that legal actors create a shared normative world—a nomos—
through operative narratives and that all legal production and interpretation
takes place within the nomos.178 Narrative studies within law advanced the
project of excavating contestable narratives and then of crafting counternarratives and counter-histories to challenge them.179 More contemporary
theories of judicial and juror decision making have moved away from the
literary emphasis of narrative theory, drawing instead on fields ranging
from logical philosophy to behavioral economics.180 These contemporary
theories and older narrative-based theories share a central insight: Decision
makers impose order on the teeming facts of the world by screening in
evidence that is confirming and screening out evidence that is confounding,
consistently preferring the interpretation that conforms to their
expectations.
2. Confounding Claims and the Quantum of Proof Needed to “Prove”
Degrees of doubt often inversely shadow degrees of understanding and
acceptance. Thresholds of proof track cultural narratives and evolve as
those narratives evolve. Up through the mid-twentieth century, when it was
commonly believed that women lied about consensual sex to protect their
reputations for chastity or fabricated a rape claim entirely, more evidence
of rape was necessary to render credible a complainant’s allegation.181
Statutes requiring independent corroboration of the rape victim’s
complaint, which have their roots in biblical law, were in force in
jurisdictions in the United States through the 1970s.182 Other formal
178. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover,
Nomos]; see also Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV.
179, 180 (1985) [hereinafter Cover, Folktales].
179. Narrative studies are not a single movement but a methodology engaged in by legal scholars
working in various domains, particularly in critical race studies and in law and literature. For
foundational works emphasizing the role of narrative in constructing law’s nomos, see Cover, Nomos,
supra note 178; Cover, Folktales, supra note 176; LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940).
180. See infra notes 187–202 (discussing work by Pardo, Allen, Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky, and
others).
181. Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–9 (1977).
182. See Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365,
1367–68 (1972); Irving Younger, The Requirement of Corroboration in Prosecutions for Sex Offenses
in New York, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 264–67 (1971); see also Berger, supra note 181, at 9
(describing the history of the corroboration statutes).
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sources of evidence practice, like pattern jury instructions, also embodied
the doubt and skepticism facing rape complainants. Even into the 1980s,
pattern jury instructions stated that failure to promptly report a claim of
rape supported an inference of fabrication.183 Another jury instruction,
derived from Lord Hale, cautioned jurors that a rape accusation ‘“is one
which is easily made. . . . [T]he law requires that you examine the
testimony of the [alleged victim] with caution.”184
Evidence law and practice in this area emerged from and reinforced
norms of suspicion about women’s veracity, especially as to matters of
sex.185 They incorporated, too, a concern about fraud: Fraudulent claims are
easy to make and hard to disprove. In these areas, subsequent dialogue
between research data and normative change has altered the landscape of
proof—not so much through changes in law itself as through changes in the
default expectations of the participants in the system.186
Chronic pain is not equivalent to crimes of sexual assault, and chronic
pain claimants are not viewed in a manner directly equivalent to rape
victims. But the former is an illustrative parallel to the latter for several
reasons. Chronic pain affects both men and women but affects women
disproportionately; background concerns about the unreliable female
narrator thus affect pain claimants, too.187 Chronic pain claims, like claims
of sexual victimization, have long invited doubt and even presumptions of
fabrication. And the hysterical or secondary gain theories of chronic pain
share an origin with some of the psychoanalytic theories suggesting that
women fantasize sexual violence, specifically because they enjoy the status
of victimhood or the subjective feeling of victimization itself.188 Further,
and perhaps most importantly, the history of change in evidence law related

183. Berger, supra note 181, at 10 n.72; see also Dawn M. DuBois, A Matter of Time: Evidence
of a Victim’s Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1087 (1988) (describing the
continued vitality of this rule in New York and other jurisdictions through the late 1980s).
184. Berger, supra note 181, at 10 (citing as an example a then-common jury instruction,
California Jury Instructions, Crim. (CALJIC) No. 10.22 (3d ed. 1970)).
185. Id. at 11 (arguing that these features of rape evidence law “stem[] mainly from a deep
distrust of the female accuser. Indeed, the quoted jury instructions all but make the point explicit.”).
186. This is not to suggest that the reform project in these areas is complete. Despite formal
changes, scholars argue that the legal process continues to be shaped by these troublingly persistent
norms. Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased
Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 778 (2001).
187. See Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. C IN . L. R EV . 285, 287 (2005);
Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias Against Women in the
Treatment of Pain, 29 J.L. MED . & E THICS 13 passim (2001).
188. See CHARLOTTE KRAUSE PROZAN, FEMINIST PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 160–62
(1992) (describing work of Helene Deutsch and Marie Bonaparte in developing early psychoanalytic
theory of the female character as masochistic and thus prone to seeking and enjoying suffering). Cf.
PAULA J. CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF WOMEN’S MASOCHISM (1985) (challenging characterization of the
female character as masochistic).
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to rape shows how evidence incorporates and reinforces background
expectations or schemas about particular kinds of claimants.
Reliance on narratives and background expectations may conflict with
“the truth-seeking goals of trial” and “risk distortions in fact-finding.”189
Several scholars have pointed to these risks and flaws in decision making
as opportunities “to increase analytic processing” by nudging trials away
from the narrative model.190 It is likely that aspects of narrative are
inescapable in the legal process; indeed, narrative may be essential to all
legal endeavors, given that the structures and forms of the legal systems
have emerged from human cognition. The purpose here would not be to
remove narrative itself, but to change the narrative expectations and
content.
Contemporary models offer a range of alternative accounts of how
judges and jurors weigh diverse facts to reach a verdict or judgment. Like
the narrative model, these models also rely heavily on decision makers’
background assumptions about the world—that is, their norms and
expectations. Michael Pardo and Ronald Allen have advanced a decisionmaking model that they call the “explanation-based model.”191 In their
account, jurors engage in a technique of “inference to the best explanation,”
(known formally in logical philosophy as “abductive reasoning”), to arrive
at a conclusion that reconciles the facts of the case in a way that is “simple”
and “coherent.”192 By “coherent,” Pardo and Allen mean a story that “better
accords with background beliefs . . . .”193 As in the narrative model, the
abductive or explanation-based model describes and predicts that decision
makers discount or outright reject facts that do not comport with their
background beliefs. Thus, background beliefs do a large share of the work
in both explaining how decision makers weigh evidence and in constituting
what counts as legal proof.
Evidence scholarship that draws on behavioral economics also supports
the role of background expectations or culturally received stories. Several
of the key heuristics and biases identified by behavioral economics support
the conclusion that decision makers prefer confirming stories and resist
confounding stories. Following the influential work of Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman, prominent scholars like Dan Simon have explored the

189. Griffin, supra note 177, at 285.
190. Id.; Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW
& PHIL. 223, 225 n.3 (2008).
191. Pardo & Allen, supra note 190, at 225.
192. Id. at 226.
193. Id. at 230; see also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 521 (1991).
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implications of a “two system” method of decision making.194 The “two
system” hypothesis posits that people engage functionally (albeit not
neurologically) distinct cognitive systems for making different kinds of
decisions.195 People mobilize System 1 for rapid, intuitive decision making;
they mobilize a functionally distinct System 2 for more considered or
“rational” decisions.
Decisions achieved via one system are not necessarily better than those
achieved by the other; both forms of decision making have strengths and
weaknesses. However, empirical research demonstrates that rapid System 1
decisions are highly inaccurate when subjects rely on intuition about
subjects in which they do not have deep experience.196 This is troubling
because most daily decision making could be described as System 1; yet,
most of the decisions one must reach in a legal context are outside of the
ordinary experience of decision makers. Where intuitive decision making is
not grounded in experience or expertise, but instead informed by received
cultural stories and “common sense,” it tends to recapitulate
misinformation and stereotype. Such research suggests, depressingly, most
people’s intuitions are wrong most of the time—even though, to the
decision maker, the intuitive decision feels so right.197
Mobilizing the language of narrative theory and of behavioral
economics, Professor Griffin argues that behavioral economics research
confirms the ways in which narrative has a significant effect on fact
finding.198 Narrative expectations, she argues, “provide[] a deep structure
inside the courtroom just as [they do] outside of it . . . .”199 This is because
judges and jurors exhibit “confirmation bias”—that is, the tendency to
“interpret evidence in a fashion that supports existing preferences, beliefs,
expectations, and theories.”200 Further, in “moments of uncertainty,” judges
and jurors (like all people faced with complex or uncertain decisions)
display “belief perseverance,” which makes them “more likely to doubt
evidence that conflicts with a preexisting paradigm and to interpret what is

194. Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND . L. R EV . 143, 184
(2011).
195. Id. at 184–85.
196. And even some kinds of expert intuition can be highly inaccurate. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 234–44 (2011) (discussing when expert opinions are, and are not, reliable).
197. Id.
198. Griffin, supra note 177, at 291.
199. Id. at 293.
200. Id. at 313 (citing D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7, 15
(2002)). For the foundational work in behavioral economics, including work on confirmation bias, see
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos
Tversky eds., 1982).
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ambiguous as consistent with that belief.”201 Yet, such decision makers feel
that they have come to accurate, factual decisions, rejecting that “implicit
emotional response[s]” could affect them as “source[s] of prejudice.”202
These accounts—narrative, abductive, and behavioral economic—
about how cognitive processes shape evidence law and trial process share a
fundamental premise.203 Background expectations about the nature of the
world and people’s behavior shape what decision makers credit as proof,
how they weigh such proof, and the conclusions that they draw from such
proof. These theories are all formalized ways of stating that people (a)
reject as implausible that which conflicts with what they believe they know
and (b) seek to construct accounts from evidence that comport with their
beliefs “about what typically happens in the world.”204 And rightly so; it
would be impossible to navigate the world without relying on background
expectations. Yet, unstated background expectations can also lead to
systematic prejudices and errors, as the next section will explore.
B. “Soft” Practices of Evidence Law Encode Bias
While reliance on story and archetype are not inherently objectionable
and may be unavoidable, it is important to attend to where narrative
operates and to its particular content. “[A]djudication produces
institutionalized meaning from evidence”; thus it is important to examine
“constructs and procedures” that facilitate or inhibit the accuracy of the
legal process.205 Indeed, evidence law and practice is rife with examples of
the ways in which background expectations distort the fact-finding process
and lead decision makers astray. Just a few include the common bias in
favor of the reliability of—and, hence, both admissibility and weight
accorded to—eyewitness identifications,206 the correlation between a

201. Griffin, supra note 177, at 312–13 n. 178 (citing Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation
and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979) (“[J]udgments about the validity, reliability,
relevance, and sometimes even the meaning of proffered evidence are biased by the apparent
consistency of that evidence with the perceiver’s theories and expectations.”)).
202. Griffin, supra note 177, at 314.
203. See id. at 294 (noting that these several “theories contemplate that jurors will draw upon
their own backgrounds to construct and evaluate explanations for the evidence”).
204. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 193, at 522, 589.
205. Griffin, supra note 177, at 290.
206. See Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing
Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 115,
119–20 (2006); see also, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing district
court’s exclusion of expert testimony on reliability of eyewitness identification); United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability to be
admissible).
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witness’s confidence in a memory and the accuracy of that memory,207 and
the disproportionate credibility decision makers assign to forensic sciences
(the so-called “CSI effect”).208
The chronic pain claimant currently faces high degrees of skepticism—
she is “the girl who cried pain.”209 But this, too, is likely to change as
greater understanding of the facts of chronic pain diseases spread through
legal and general culture. Judicial and continuing legal education, and the
use of expert witnesses to educate juries (and judges) within the courtroom,
can change the normative and factual expectations of the participants
within these systems.
Adjudicators’ skepticism of, or hostility toward, chronic pain claimants
may arise in some part from a pre-scientific vision of pain as emotional
dysfunction, which emerged from a historical literature that few readers
today would recognize as medical or scientific: the “anecdata” of the
psychoanalytic case history, like the Anna O. case discussed in Part I,
which are an often highly unreliable narrative form. These tropes continue
to be peddled today; even a cursory Amazon.com search reveals dozens of
popular books extoling the premise that a person who adjusts her attitude
and acknowledges her emotions will free herself of persistent chronic
pain—in as little as one day.210 Similarly, there is an industry of defense
experts that supports this relationship.211
Contemporary pain researchers acknowledge the essential
interrelationship of one’s emotional life and the life of the body, but not in
this magical, mind-over-matter manner.212 Along with rejecting hysteria as
the etiology of chronic pain, mainstream pain scientists similarly make
short shrift of previously popular ideas like “secondary gain,” the
increasingly-discredited notion that people with long-term, unexplained
chronic pain unconsciously exaggerate or manufacture their pain because

207. Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the
Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 739, 745 (2007); 35 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts
§ 46 (“[I]n study after study, it has been demonstrated that one’s confidence in the accuracy [of] the
recollection of an event is not a good predictor of the actual accuracy of the recall.”); United States v.
Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1400 (3d Cir. 1991) (approving testimony of the low correlation between
confidence and accuracy “[t]o rebut the natural assumption that such a strong expression of confidence
indicates an unusually reliable identification”).
208. See Evan W. Durnal, Crime Scene Investigation (As Seen on TV), FORENSIC SCI. INT’L,
June 15, 2010, at 1.
209. See Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 187.
210. John E. Sarno publishes bestsellers promising that people can be free of chronic pain by
letting go of perfectionism and repressed anger. See, e.g., JOHN E. SARNO, HEALING BACK PAIN: THE
MIND-BODY CONNECTION (2010); JOHN E. SARNO, MIND OVER BACK PAIN (1999).
211. See Finch, supra note 187, at 301 n.115 and accompanying text (collecting cases, with
examples).
212. See infra notes 214–217 and accompanying text.

4 PUSTILNIK 1099-1158 (DO NOT DELETE)

1142

Alabama Law Review

5/6/2015 2:42 PM

[Vol. 66:5:1099

they enjoy the status, attention, or other intangible benefits that come to
them by virtue of being disabled.213
Emotion and pain are related in important ways. First and foremost,
pain creates a negative emotional experience (if we perceived it as a
positive experience, it would be pleasure).214 Chronic pain has emotional
consequences as sufferers miss out on living the lives they had or wish they
could have; social isolation, loss of work, loss of income, and, of course,
constant suffering, lead to understandable emotional distress.215 Chronic
pain compromises the brain’s cognitive and affective functioning, creating
cognitive and emotional difficulties as a side effect of the pain syndrome.216
Depressed mood and stress can augment the experience of pain, while
pleasurable and distracting activities, and strong social support, can
moderate pain.217
Yet, the one way in which emotion and chronic pain most frequently
are not related is the one embedded in our legal system: that chronic pain is
predominantly a form of hysteria in which emotionally-disturbed people
unconsciously generate the experience of pain. The next section proposes
ways in which this new understanding of chronic pain, and of the
relationship between chronic pain and emotion, should reform evidentiary
doctrines and practices related to chronic pain.

213. David Servan-Schreiber et al., Somatizing Patients: Part I. Practical Diagnosis, 61 AM.
FAM. PHYSICIAN 1073, 1075 (2000) (“[T]he somatizing patient seems to seek the sick role, which
affords relief from stressful or impossible interpersonal expectations . . . and, in most societies, provides
attention, caring and sometimes even monetary reward . . . .”). See Rollin M. Gallagher, Secondary
Gain in Pain Medicine: Let Us Stick with Biobehavioral Data, 3 AM. PAIN SOC’Y J. 274, 274 (1994).
See generally David A. Fishbain, Secondary Gain Concept: Definition Problems and Its Abuse in
Medical Practice, 3 AM. PAIN SOC’Y J. 264 (1994).
214. Ronald Melzack and P.D. Wall formalized the relationship between physical and affective
in the experience of pain in their landmark 1965 paper The Gate Control Theory of Pain. See Ronald
Melzack & P.D. Wall, The Gate Control Theory of Pain: A Re-Examination and Re-Statement, 101
BRAIN 1 (1978) (updating and augmenting the 1965 paper that proposed the original model). Since
1979, the standard medical definition of pain has described pain’s dual composition as “[a]n unpleasant
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in
terms of such damage.” INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF PAIN, PAIN TERM: A
CURRENT LIST WITH DEFINITIONS AND NOTES ON USAGE (2011), available at http://iasp.files.cmsplus.com/Content/ContentFolders/Publications2/ClassificationofChronicPain/Part_III-PainTerms.pdf
(defining “pain”).
215. David A. Fishbain et al., Chronic Pain-Associated Depression: Antecedent or Consequence
of Chronic Pain? A Review, 13 CLINICAL J. OF PAIN 116, 137 (1997) (meta-analysis of research
assessing the relationship of chronic pain and depression; concluding that most chronic pain patients
develop depression subsequent to and resulting from chronic pain).
216. A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic Pain Patients Are Impaired on an Emotional DecisionMaking Task, 108 PAIN 129, 129, 136 (2004) (finding “that chronic pain is associated with a specific
cognitive deficit, which may impact everyday behavior especially in . . . emotionally laden[]
situations”; hypothesizing that pain interferes with affective processing, leading to reduced affective
decision-making performance).
217. Katja Wiech & Irene Tracey, The Influence of Negative Emotions on Pain: Behavioral
Effects and Neural Mechanisms, 47 NEUROIMAGE 987 (2009) (surveying literature on point).
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C. New “Soft” Evidentiary Norms for Adjudicators and Fact Finders
A new set of norms about chronic pain ought to be incorporated into
the legal system to unseat the pejorative and medically outmoded premises
built into the SSDI regime, judicial interpretations of SSDI regulations, and
decisions makers’ presumptions in non-SSDI cases. This section presents a
new, suggested set of default norms.
From a rebuttable presumption of hysteria or fraud to a neutral
presumption. The first and most important normative shift around chronic
pain starts with baseline presumptions. Although not universal, a common
presumption is that the chronic pain claimant is mentally ill or is
fabricating the claim. In place of this pejorative norm, with its lingering
Freudianism, there ought to be a neutral presumption that the pain claimant,
like any other disability or tort claimant, may or may not be credible and
needs to prove her case.
Chronic pain is not a form of mental illness. Chronic pain is not a
mental illness and typically does not result from mental illness. Depressive
illness and cognitive impairment more often follow the development of a
chronic pain condition than precede it. In a subset of chronic pain patients,
a history of trauma may have created a biological predisposition to develop
chronic pain in response to an injury. Whether a claimant had this latent
predisposition does not make the condition the claimant’s fault, nor does it
mean that he or she can fix the subsequently-developed pain condition
through addressing the emotional issue. Rather, it makes these individuals
the classic vulnerable victims or “glass jaw” plaintiffs.
Psychogenic pain conditions do occur. However, as the DSM-IV
cautions, these conditions are rare and unusual. According to the DSM-IV,
psychiatrists (and others) should be reluctant to diagnose psychogenic pain
or somatoform disorder in the absence of clear indicators that the chronic
pain condition does not result primarily from a non-psychiatric medical
condition.218
Chronic pain cannot be braved away with a positive attitude.
Culturally-received stories of people being miraculously cured of their
chronic pain through identifying and resolving an emotional conflict are
just that—stories. They may in some cases be true stories, just as some
religious believers in fact experience remission of disease symptoms
through faith healing. Yet, such anecdotes do not prove that chronic pain
can be talked away through psychotherapy or braved away through positive
thinking any more than faith healing experiences suggest that most
hospitals should be converted into churches.
218. TASK F ORCE ON DSM-IV, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-IV-TR 490, 503 (4th ed. rev. 2000).
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Chronic pain fluctuates, and chronic pain conditions can be relapsingremitting. People with chronic pain conditions have good days and bad
days. These good days and bad days may relate to the lifecourse of the
disease or to patient-specific or external factors, including degree of social
support, physical therapy, medical treatment, financial and other pressures,
and overall mood.219 In an otherwise medically well-substantiated case,
decision makers should understand that the presence of good days does not
mean the person is faking it on the bad days, nor should they see the
positive impact of social and emotional support as a sign that the pain
condition is emotional in origin. This understanding of chronic pain as
inherently variable, relapsing/remitting, and affected by life circumstances,
is contrary to the Fifth Circuit standard that, to be legally disabling, chronic
pain must be “constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to
therapeutic treatment.”220
Paternalism toward chronic pain patients is inappropriate and antitherapeutic. Decision makers adjudicating chronic pain claims at times
adopt a questionable paternalism toward chronic pain claimants. One such
notion is that attention and compensation perpetuate the claimant’s pain by
“rewarding” the pain behavior. This belief leads to the conclusion that
chronic pain claimants need to be denied compensation as a kind of “tough
love” that will help them move on with their lives. There are three
problems with this approach, one of which is factual and two of which are
legal. The factual issue is that there is no evidence that the reward theory is
true, and a lot of evidence that it is not.221 The first legal issue is that this
approach violates horizontal equity: As to no other condition or category of
claimants do decision makers argue that they ought to withhold otherwise
merited compensation for the good of the claimant. The second legaltheoretical problem with the reward theory relates to the institutional role
of the decision maker. Judges have an important and appropriate role in
interpreting law and regulations and in developing the common law. Doing
so is not judicial activism, it is judicial performance. However, if a law or
regulation provides that a disability is compensable, or tort law provides
that a negligently caused impairment is compensable, then it is
inappropriate activism for the judge to treat differently one category of
disabilities or impairments based on beliefs about what would be good for
the plaintiff/claimant.

219. Decision makers should understand that, although low mood can exacerbate pain, depressed
mood itself generally does not cause chronic pain. See supra notes 214–217.
220. See supra Section III.C.1.
221. Nicholas Shenker, et al., Developing Concepts in Allodynic Pain, 8 CLIN. MED. 79, 79
(2008) (dismissing secondary gain as medically unsubstantiated, blaming “legal profession” for
perpetuating the concept).
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V. CHRONIC PAIN NEUROIMAGING AND “HARD” EVIDENCE PRACTICES:
THE CASE FOR LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY OF PAIN NEUROIMAGING
Moving on from “soft” evidentiary considerations involving norms and
narratives, this Part considers “hard” or black letter legal questions about
the admissibility of expert evidence concerning chronic pain that emerges
from pain neuroimaging studies. Neuroimaging, and testimony about such
neuroimaging, concerning the ways chronic pain changes the brain ought to
be admissible in suitable cases. Such evidence will not be relevant in every
case involving a chronic pain claim. The best and most valid uses of such
evidence will be to inform the fact finders’ and adjudicators’ understanding
of what chronic pain is and to assist them in their evaluation of the rest of
the evidence. Aggregate neuroimaging evidence showing how chronic pain
changes the brain can educate the fact finder, first, about the reality of
chronic pain diseases and, second, about how a particular chronic pain
condition may on average affect sufferers’ brains and behaviors. It should
not, however, be admitted to prove or disprove the presence of chronic pain
in any individual claimant, as neuroimaging techniques are not sufficiently
reliable at the individual level.
Claims involving chronic pain may arise in federal, state, or
administrative proceedings. This Part opens by briefly describing the
federal, state, and Social Security administrative (“SSA”) standards for
admitting expert medical and scientific evidence. These evidentiary
regimes differ in important ways; they vary as to whether they prescribe
specific tests for the qualifications of experts and expert evidence, and if
so, as to the tests they prescribe. Yet the touchstone of admissibility across
all of them is the same: whether the evidence is relevant and whether its
relevance outweighs its potential to mislead or confuse the finder of fact.
Thus, while recognizing the ways in which these evidentiary regimes vary,
this Part offers largely consistent proposals for what types of pain
neuroimaging evidence should, and should not, be admitted in federal,
state, or SSA proceedings.
A. Federal, State, and Administrative Admissibility Standards
Federal, state, and SSA rules for the admissibility of expert scientific
and medical evidence are designed to admit evidence that is relevant and
helpful to the fact finder, and to exclude evidence that is not. These three
regimes may be characterized as falling on a continuum, on which the SSA
is the most liberal in admitting medical and scientific evidence, the Federal
Rules of Evidence occupy a middle ground, and state evidence laws
modeled on the Frye standard are the most restrictive. Despite their
differences, however, relevant neuroimaging evidence offered to educate
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the finder of fact about various pain conditions ought to satisfy each of
these admissibility standards. This short section describes standards for
expert evidence under each of these regimes and then applies these
standards to evaluate the admissibility of this type of evidence.
1. Federal Rules of Evidence
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 702 govern the admissibility of
expert evidence, including scientific and medical evidence.222 Rule 401
provides that all relevant evidence is admissible, unless it is subject to some
special exclusion; evidence is not admissible if it is not relevant.223 Once a
court has determined that proffered expert evidence is relevant, it evaluates
its admissibility under Rule 702, which governs expert evidence. The
touchstone of admissibility under Rule 702 is whether the expert evidence
will “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue.”224 If a matter is within the experience and understanding of
jurors, expert evidence on that matter is not admissible because of the
concern that the expert will usurp the function of the jury. If a matter is
outside of the understanding and experience of the typical juror, and it is
material to the determination of some aspect of the case, a court may admit
expert testimony to enable jurors to come to an informed conclusion about
the matter.225
After a court determines that expert evidence may aid the jury, the
burden is on the proponent of the evidence to demonstrate that it satisfies
threshold requirements set forth in Rule 702. Rule 702, which incorporates
standards that the Supreme Court developed in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals,226 requires that the expert testimony be “based on
sufficient facts or data” and that it be “the product of reliable principles and
methods.”227 Finally, the expert must have “applied the principles and
methods [reliably] to the facts of the case.”228 Even evidence based on
reliable principles and methods, though, must be excluded if “there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.”229
222. FED. R. EVID. 401, 702.
223. FED. R. EVID. 401.
224. FED. R. EVID. 702.
225. FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (expert witnesses may testify as to matters of opinion if the opinion
“will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”).
226. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
227. FED. R. EVID. 702.
228. Id.
229. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[C]onclusions and methodology are
not entirely distinct from one another. . . . A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”).
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The precise meaning of these requirements has given rise to a large
body of literature and some significant dispute.230 The rule itself offers no
guidance on what makes a principle or method “reliable,” or on what
makes facts and data “sufficient.” Further, the rule is entirely silent on how
a court ought to determine whether the principles and methods—even if
reliable and sufficient—are adequately related to the expert’s conclusion.
Daubert lists a few illustrative factors that a trial judge may consider to
assess the reliability and sufficiency of expert evidence. These include
whether the “the theory or technique . . . has been subjected to peer
review,” whether it has a “known or potential error rate,” and “whether it
has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific
community.”231
As Professor Eleanor Swift has noted, this standard grants wide latitude
to trial judges as gatekeepers of scientific evidence.232 Scholars and judges
agree that it tends toward liberal admissibility: Many judges engage in
limited independent evaluation of medical, scientific, or other expert
evidence and instead trust the adversary process to test evidence through a
“battle of [the] experts.”233
2. State Rules of Evidence
State evidence codes, like the Federal Rules of Evidence, also
condition the admissibility of any evidence on its relevance: Relevant
evidence is presumptively admissible while irrelevant evidence is not.234
However, many states apply a standard to expert evidence that is more
restrictive than the federal standard, excluding otherwise-relevant evidence
if it has not gained “general acceptance” within the relevant expert
community.235 This general acceptance standard, first articulated in Frye v.
230. Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries of
Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827 (2008); Thomas A. Mauet, The New World of Experts in
Federal and State Courts, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 223 (2001).
231. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580.
232. Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 2437 (2000).
233. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1121, 1125–26 (2001) (surveying scholarly and judicial opinion).
234. State evidence codes have provisions that are analogous or identical to Rule 401. Compare
FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”),
with CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 2014) (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence
relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”), and TEX. R.
EVID. 401 (West 2014) (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”).
235. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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United States nearly a century ago,236 remains in use to some degree in
many states.237 Different states, however, apply Frye somewhat differently:
Some adhere to Frye strictly, while others merely consider general
acceptance as one factor in the admissibility determination. In many states
that ostensibly follow Frye, judges engage in a broader reliability inquiry
similar to the inquiry under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.238
To determine whether expert evidence has gained general acceptance
under Frye or a Frye-like test, courts principally look at whether the
evidence itself, or the techniques and methods from which it is derived,
have achieved particular status in the relevant expert community.239 Courts
may look at whether the evidence is considered uncontroversial within the
research field, or whether the evidence or methods on which it is based
appear in textbooks and major treatises. This inquiry is significantly more
conservative than under the federal rule, because scientific and medical
consensus can take decades to achieve, if consensus emerges at all.
Additionally, the Frye test provides a different role for the judge: Under the
federal rule, the judge must determine the reliability of expert evidence;
under Frye, the judge must delegate that determination to experts in the
field by establishing whether they would find the evidence acceptable.
3. SSA Administrative Proceedings
In administrative proceedings, the administrative law judge (ALJ) is
both trier of law and finder of fact, much like a state or federal judge in a
bench trial.240 All agency proceedings are governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).241 The APA authorizes agencies to take evidence in
their proceedings; yet, it does not provide rules of evidence. Instead,
agencies promulgate their own evidentiary rules and practices. This short
section focuses exclusively on the evidentiary rules and procedures of the
236. Id.
237. States still following Frye include: California, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1994); In
re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1188 (Ill. 2004); State v. Shively, 999 P.2d 952, 955
(Kan. 2000); Burral v. Maryland, 724 A.2d 65, 70 (Md.1999); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800,
803 (Minn. 2000); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 621 (N.J. 1997); People v. Angelo, 666 N.E.2d 1333,
1335 (N.Y. 1996); Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. 1999); Washington v. Copeland,
922 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996).
238. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific
Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 478–79 (2005) (“[I]n criminal cases, the adoption of the
Daubert test, whether in state or federal court, had no statistically significant effect on admission
rates.”).
239. Id. at 476.
240. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1 (2013) states that “[a]ll adjudicators . . . have the authority to find facts
and, if appropriate, to conduct a fair and impartial hearing in accordance with section 205(b) of the
Act.”
241. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012).
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Social Security Administration because of that agency’s role in
adjudicating disability claims.
In SSA disability determinations, ALJs’ evidentiary determinations are
governed by a flexible, general standard rather than by a code equivalent to
the Federal Rules of Evidence.242 Title 20 C.F.R. § 405.350 states that the
claimant has “[t]he right to appear and present evidence”243 and that “[t]he
administrative law judge may receive any evidence at the hearing that he or
she believes relates to your claim.”244 Section 405.331 of the same title
instructs the claimant to “submit with your request for hearing any
evidence that you have available to you.”245 Evidence “must be complete
and detailed enough” for an adjudicator to determine the existence of the
disability and its duration and severity.246 Additionally, section 405.1(c)(2)
states that the SSA “also will consider any relevant information that we
have in our records.”247
Beyond these very general evidentiary provisions set forth in the
federal regulations, the SSA has promulgated guidance for claimants in its
Bluebook. The Bluebook instructs claimants that a disability claim requires
medical evidence from treating physicians,248 but that the SSA also accepts
and reviews medical evidence from other ‘“acceptable medical
sources.’”249 An “acceptable medical source” includes a “nonexamining
source,” meaning a “physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical
source who has not examined you but provides a medical or other opinion
in your case.”250 The Bluebook indicates in broad terms the kinds of expert
evidence that a claimant may submit. Yet, unlike the federal and state rules,
it does not establish any criteria relating to the quality of the expert
evidence. These provisions constitute the entirety of the SSA regulations
concerning the admissibility of evidence in disability proceedings, a stark
contrast to the detailed federal and state rules of evidence and all their
resulting interpretive case law.

242. Title 20 C.F.R. § 405.1 (2013) sets forth the SSA’s “procedures for adjudicating the
disability portion of initial claims for entitlement to benefits based on disability under title II of the
Social Security Act. . . .”
243. § 405.350(a).
244. § 405.350(b).
245. § 405.331(a).
246. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d) (OASDI); 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(e) (SSI).
247. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c)(2).
248. Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: Part II - Evidentiary Requirements, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/evidentiary.htm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
249. Id.
250. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502.

4 PUSTILNIK 1099-1158 (DO NOT DELETE)

1150

Alabama Law Review

5/6/2015 2:42 PM

[Vol. 66:5:1099

4. Common Features of These Regimes: Relevance and Reliability
Despite the formal differences between these regimes,251 evidence
determinations under all of these regimes share a common foundation:
They are grounded in relevance, and to varying extents, they require
reliability and helpfulness to the finder of fact.252 Because of these
similarities, the admissibility of neuroimaging evidence ought to be
substantially similar in federal, state, and administrative proceedings.
All of these regimes depart from the presumption that all relevant
evidence is admissible. Federal and state practice, although balanced in
favor of the admissibility of all relevant evidence under Rule 401, do
permit some relevant evidence to be excluded: Relevant evidence may be
excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, or has the tendency to
mislead or confuse the jury.253 Relevant evidence also may be excluded if it
constitutes impermissible hearsay or if it violates constitutional
requirements, like the right of confrontation.254 The SSA regime admits
relevant evidence more liberally, as it has no special exclusions equivalent
to the federal and state exclusionary rules.255 Finally, the regulations
impose an affirmative obligation on the SSA to search its own records for
any relevant evidence and to bring such evidence forward in a
proceeding.256
Federal and state evidence law specifies criteria designed to assist the
judge in determining whether proffered expert evidence is reliable. The
SSA regime appears to differ from the federal and state rules in that it does
not set forth criteria for evaluating the reliability of expert evidence. Yet it,
too, implicitly contains a reliability requirement: Evidence that is not at
reliable cannot be relevant, since that which is false, misleading, or of
indeterminate reliability cannot aid the search for truth.
Beyond relevance and reliability, to the extent that those criteria differ,
federal and state rules also limit expert evidence to that which is “help[ful]
[to] the trier of fact” by informing them on subjects outside of jurors’
ordinary competence.257 As with reliability, the SSA standard appears to be
251. The evidentiary rules are relatively informal because the administrative proceeding is
defined as “non-adversarial.” 20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c)(1).
252. See William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 N.Y.L
SCH. L. REV. 829, 831 (2005).
253. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also, e.g., MD. R. 5-403 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-403 (2013);
WIS. STAT. § 904.03 (2013).
254. See FED. R. EVID. 801 et seq.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
255. Hearsay evidence that would be excluded in a federal or state proceeding may be admitted
in an SSA proceeding. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971).
256. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c)(2).
257. FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (expert witnesses may testify as to matters of opinion if the opinion
“will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”); Mukhtar v. Cal.
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silent on this point yet implicitly mirrors the federal and state rules. Title 20
C.F.R. § 405.350 states in the conditional form that the “[t]he
administrative law judge may receive any evidence . . . that he or she
believes relates to your claim.”258 Since the judge is vested with discretion
to determine what relevant evidence to include or exclude, this suggests he
or she may determine which evidence will help to adjudicate the claim.
The broad similarity between these three evidence regimes argues that
expert neuroscientific evidence, including evidence derived from pain
neuroimaging, ought to be similarly admissible in federal, state, and SSA
proceedings. States that follow Frye closely will apply the most restrictive
standard. Yet, rigorous pain neuroimaging evidence offered for aggregate
or educative purposes ought to pass even the Frye test in many cases.
Although there are differences between evidence regimes that will lead
to admissibility differences at the margin, under all three regimes,
aggregate neuroimaging evidence of chronic pain ought to be admissible if
offered for a relevant purpose. The following section will propose usecases in which pain neuroimaging could be relevant and in which it likely
ought to be admissible under each evidence regime. It also sets forth the
case for why neuroimaging currently ought to be admissible only for
aggregate purposes, while pointing to a future in which scans of individual
claimants may be sufficiently rigorous to merit admission.
B. Recommendations on the Admissibility of Pain Neuroimaging Evidence
This section first proposes the major categories in which neurosciencebased evidence about chronic pain conditions may be relevant. It then
suggests what kinds of neuroscience evidence may be sufficiently reliable
to gain admissibility under all three evidence regimes and what kinds of
evidence, or what claims relative to chronic pain neuroscience evidence,
may not be sufficiently reliable to pass one or more of the federal, state,
and SSA evidentiary thresholds. This focus on relevance first, and then
reliability, mirrors the architecture of the Federal Rules, whose drafters
logically suggested that relevance precedes all other considerations.

State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1065 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Vallejo, 237
F.3d 1008, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)) (expert opinion should “address an issue beyond the common
knowledge of the average layman”); New Jersey v. Torres, 874 A.2d 1084, 1096 (N.J. 2005)
(“[E]xpert’s testimony must be restricted to those areas that fall outside the common knowledge of
jurors.”).
258. 20 C.F.R. § 405.350(b) (emphasis added).
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1. Pain Neuroimaging Is Sufficiently Reliable to Be Admitted for
Some Purposes
Pain neuroimaging evidence should be admissible in certain cases to
help the finder of fact understand the nature of chronic pain diseases, to
demonstrate general features of chronic pain diseases, and to show the
average impact of such diseases on the neurological function of sufferers.
Testimony grounded in structural and functional neuroimaging of chronic
pain, when offered for these limited purposes, should satisfy the federal
Daubert and state Frye standards (with some exceptions), as well as the
more permissive relevance and reliability standards in SSA proceedings.
There are several strong uses-cases for aggregate neuroimaging
evidence in cases where chronic pain is at issue, all of which fall into the
category of expert-as-educator. Neuroscience-based evidence relating to
chronic pain could be offered as relevant to matters within the following
three general categories: (a) the biology of chronic pain; (b) the cognitive
and affective effects and implications of chronic pain; and (c) general
debiasing, that is, correcting implicit biases or mistaken inferences
adjudicators or jurors may draw from their own experience. Given the
nearly limitless variety of facts in the world, and advocates’ creativity in
working with them, these categories do not capture all potentially relevant
uses of such evidence. The arguments in this section draw on and
incorporate the scientific material presented in Part II, supra; accordingly,
the supporting research is not repeated here.
a. Relevance Case: General Biology of Chronic Pain
Evidence grounded in neuroimaging, including brain images
themselves, could help explain to ALJs and to jurors features of chronic
pain that may be puzzling or counterintuitive to the non-expert. There are
four major concepts about chronic pain that decision makers should know
because they may be important to adjudicating a case. These four concepts
are outside of the experience of lay jurors and ALJs; indeed, they likely are
outside the experience even of physicians who do not practice in the
chronic pain area. These concepts track those introduced in Part III.C,
concerning the role of neuroimaging in changing norms, but here are not
limited to disability and apply to any case involving chronic pain claims.
First, experts may inform decision makers about how brain-based
processes modulate pain experience, so that two different individuals with
the same or similar peripheral injury may experience markedly different
degrees and durations of pain.259 Such evidence would go to explaining the
259. See supra Part II.A.
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“excess” pain that some individuals experience. Evidence of central
sensitization can also aid decision makers in understanding how pain may
persist after the apparent resolution of the original injury or disease.260
Second, brain-based processes can cause a pain condition even in the
absence of a discernable peripheral injury, that is, “pain without lesion.”261
The existence of this kind of pain is the most counter-intuitive to nonspecialists and may be likely to be adjudged as fraudulent or as a form of
factitious disorder.262 Expert testimony can explain the neurological
mechanisms that give rise to such pain. It can also help construct a
clinically realistic portrait of these kinds of diseases to aid the decision
maker in coming to an accurate assessment of a particular claimant or
plaintiff.
Third, although all chronic pain conditions will share some
neurological features, distinct chronic pain conditions present distinct
patterns of brain involvement.263 Evidence on this point can aid decision
makers in understanding the reality of pain conditions. If an opposing party
introduces testimony to the effect that certain pain conditions, like
fibromyalgia or chronic headache, lack a biological basis, rebuttal
testimony about the specific neurobiology of such conditions would
become relevant.
Finally, chronic pain results in structural remodeling of the brain,
although permanence or reversibility of these changes remain under
investigation. Testimony on the degree and duration of impairment could
go to damages in a tort case.
b. Relevance Case: Cognitive and Affective Effects of Chronic
Pain
Findings from neuroimaging, along with more traditional kinds of
evidence, can help instruct the finder of fact about the cognitive and
emotional impacts of chronic pain. These impacts are not ephemeral nor
epiphenomenal: They are part of the pain disorder.264 Cognitive and
affective issues arise directly from the brain-based impairments of chronic
pain conditions.265 Pain neuroimaging and related research show how
specific cognitive and affective regions of the brain involved in pain
processing become functionally and structurally altered by pain. As
discussed infra, in Part III.B., research suggests that, when a chronic pain
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra notes 214–218 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 214–218 and accompanying text.
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sufferer and a typical person perform the same task in the lab, the pain
sufferer needs to recruit different and additional brain regions to do the
same work; the total “load” becomes higher for him or her. By analogy,
chronic pain impairs performance on a decision or task similarly to how
texting interferes with driving. The difference is that the chronic pain
sufferer cannot “put down the phone.”
Cognitive impairments may affect a claimant’s ability to work at the
pre-illness cognitive level. The affective impairments may constitute a
compensable harm in tort, as part of the overall evaluation of damages.
Affective impairments also go to the question of hedonic adaptability.266
Unlike many other forms of disability, chronic pain is unfortunately nonadaptable: The famous behavioral economist Dan Ariely, who had an
accident that left him with third-degree burns over most of his body, has
written eloquently about the non-adaptability of chronic pain.267 The
reasons for pain’s low hedonic adaptability are multiple, including that pain
hurts. Neuroimaging revealing how pain commandeers portions of the
brain’s emotional systems may provide an additional explanation: Mood
cannot fully recover where the condition itself interferes with mood
regulation. This could be relevant in a tort case to show future damages or
to rebut a defense argument for limited damages grounded in hedonic
adaptability.
c. Relevance Case: Debiasing
The experience of at least some degree of pain is universal. Pain thus
would seem to be within the knowledge and experience of the ordinary
juror. However, this very experience may mislead jurors. Chronic pain is
not like acute pain. Jurors who have experienced acute pain thus may
reason wrongly about chronic pain specifically because they are likely to
try to understand chronic pain based on their own experience of acute pain.
This creates a role for the expert witness as an educator about the nature of
this misunderstood set of conditions.
Courts have been mixed in their reception of experts as pure educators,
as in the case of experts who testify about the fallibility of eyewitness

266. Hedonic adaptation is the notion that people adjust to illness or injury, returning relatively
quickly to pre-injury levels of happiness. DAN GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 151–53, 227–28
(2006); John Bronsteen el al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1516 (2008). Some scholars thus have argued that tort recoveries should be adjusted downward
because the injured plaintiff is likely to fare better than jurors imagine. Bronsteen et al., supra. But cf.
Peter H. Huang, Emotional Adaptation and Lawsuit Settlements, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 50
(2008).
267.
Dan
Ariely,
Painful
Lessons
(Jan.
30,
2008),
http://web.mit.edu/ariely/www/MIT/Papers/mypain.pdf.
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identification.268 Some courts have permitted experts to teach the jury about
the fallibility of eyewitnesses, reasoning that such testimony is necessary to
debias jurors who otherwise will give too much weight to eyewitness
identification evidence.269 Other courts have held, conversely, that
scientific evidence concerning visual recall and identification is not a
proper subject for expert testimony because it is within the ordinary
experience of jurors.270
Testimony educating the jury about general features of chronic pain or
specific chronic pain conditions could face similar skepticism among
courts. However, expert testimony about chronic pain is readily
distinguishable from education about visual identification and recall.
Although, as with visual recall, every juror will have had experience with
pain, most will not have had experience with serious chronic pain. This
places chronic pain further outside the scope of juror competence than
eyewitness identification. If the jury does contain a member who has had
serious chronic pain, it would be more appropriate for the rest of the jury to
be educated by parties’ experts than for there to be, in effect, a covert
expert in the jury room who has not been subject to adversarial
examination.
2. Neuroimaging Should Not (Yet?) Be Admissible to Prove
Individual Pain
Neuroimaging techniques, particularly fMRI, should not be admissible
at this point under federal or state standards to prove or disprove the
presence of a chronic pain condition in any individual. The major concerns
that render such evidence currently inadmissible are identical to those that
must be resolved in order to allow for future admissibility. Moreover, these
problems currently are common to all individual, non-aggregate evidentiary
uses of all fMRI and much structural brain imaging, not just the
neuroimaging of chronic pain. These are, in this author’s view, the
problems of: baseline norming;271 reverse inference problems; 272 inter- and
268. Suedabeh Walker, Comment, Drawing on Daubert: Bringing Reliability to the Forefront in
the Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 62 EMORY L.J. 1205, 1222 n.118 (2013) (note
and accompanying text surveying jurisdictions admitting or excluding educative testimony on the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications).
269. Id. at 1222 n.118 and accompanying text; see also Eyewitness Misidentification,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http:// www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php
(last visited Sept. 18, 2013); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78 (2008)
(discussing the role of eyewitness error in wrongful convictions).
270. Walker, supra note 268, at 1222 n.118 and accompanying text.
271. Craig E.L. Stark & Larry R. Squire, When Zero Is Not Zero: The Problem of Ambiguous
Baseline Conditions in fMRI, 98 PNAS 12760 (2001) (“[T]here is no inherent baseline associated with
the blood oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal . . . that is measured in traditional functional MRI
(fMRI) studies . . . .”).
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intra-subject variation;273 high cost;274 and counter-measures (“tricking the
scanner”).275 Each of these problems relating to the validity of scans for
individual pain diagnosis is scientifically nontrivial. However, the
breathtaking pace of innovation in neuroscience and in information
processing would make it foolhardy to say “never.”
Even if future neuroimaging protocols reduce the risk of these
interpretive pitfalls, the legal system still should not develop a default
expectation that parties introduce such evidence in all chronic pain cases.
Such evidence is costly relative to other evidence that might adequately
resolve the case. A preference for scans might prejudice decision makers
against claimants who cannot afford the technique or whose condition
cannot reliably be discerned that way. This could create a CSI effect,
wherein jurors or adjudicators expect a party to produce a type of scientific
evidence simply because it exists,276 and draw an adverse inference against
the party if such evidence is not offered.277 Currently and in the foreseeable
future, it would be undesirable for scientific, economic, and normative
reasons for adjudicators and fact finders to develop an expectation that
neuroimaging should be introduced to prove pain.

CONCLUSION
At the same time that chronic pain is pervasive across important areas
of law, the law incorporates deep bias and confusion about what chronic
pain consists of and even whether it is “real.” Generations of patients and
courtroom claimants with chronic pain have been told that their condition is
“all in their heads.” Legal doctrines, including judge-made law interpreting
the Social Security Disability regulations, encode these pejorative
characterizations, which are grounded in part in skepticism about pain, an
invisible and largely unverifiable condition, and in part in a Freudian-

272. Russell A. Poldrack, Can Cognitive Processes Be Inferred from Neuroimaging Data, 10
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 59, 59 (2006) (“This is a ‘reverse inference’, in that it reasons backwards
from the presence of brain activation to the engagement of a particular cognitive function.”).
273. Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for
Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 382 (2007) (“Inter-subject variability is also a
consideration. . . . [T]wo independent subjects [may] show different patterns of activation while their
behavioral performances are comparable.”).
274. National Research Council, The Polygraph and Lie Detection, NAT’L ACAD. PRESS (2003),
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10420. (“fMRI is not presently useful” for
studying individual differences because “fMRI analysis is expensive and time-consuming”).
275. Greely & Illes, supra note 273, at 404–05 (“Simple movements of the tongue or jaw will
make fMRI scans unreadable. . . . simply thinking about other things during a task may activate other
brain regions in ways that interfere . . . .”).
276. Durnal, supra note 208, at 1.
277. See id. at 5.
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inflected construction of the chronic pain sufferer as the modern-day
hysteric.
Although not providing a pain-o-meter that will separate the honest
pain sufferer from the malingering fraudster, neuroimaging and other
technologies can play a positive role in helping to change norms, to inform
interpretation of existing laws and regulations, and contribute to
establishing new legal standards. These technologies may never produce
definitive measurements of pain and its and associated distress. And, they
may not fully surmount the problem of pain’s incommensurability across
subjects. Yet, they can shed light on pain’s mechanisms and neurological
bases. This should allow fact finders and decision makers to recognize
chronic pain in the courtroom, should allow judges to better interpret
regulations and doctrines relating to chronic pain, and should lead to the
revision of relevant regulations to provide greater guidance on when a
person may be disabled by chronic pain.
The ability to partially measure and objectify pain both will and will
not resolve difficult legal questions that turn on pain’s presence and
intensity in individual cases. This is because, even if neuroimaging could
validate pain’s presence and severity perfectly, legal actors still would need
to determine when pain, and what kinds of pain, constitute a legallyredressable impairment. Further, although new pain science and pain
imaging are powerful, they are not a panacea for every legal doctrine or
issue that appears to involve pain. Certain legal doctrines and statuses
appear to be framed in terms of pain’s presence and amount, yet cannot be
understood fully through better measurement of pain. Debates carried out
in part through competing statements about pain—like whether a pre-viable
fetus feels pain, or whether certain execution protocols are so painful as to
violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual
punishment—may in large part be coded conversations about values; not,
as they purport to be, primarily about physical facts. Thus pain imaging and
measurement would misdirect rather than illuminate, allowing decision
makers to dodge fundamental normative issues about the relationship
between citizen and state, person and person.278
As neuroimaging develops, the law will confront challenging questions
that emerge from pain, such as whether it can sustain its different treatment
of physical pain and emotional pain. Physical pain is always also an
emotional experience, and emotional pain is always produced by and
experienced in the body. All subjective states emerge from neural
substrates and have physiological correlates. In providing a window into
the subjective experiences the brain generates in pain, the neuroimaging of
278. A.C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral
Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (2012).
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pain should lead to doctrinal and practice-based revisions that increase
law’s accuracy and fairness. Beyond that, understanding pain may require
the law to rethink its current dualism between physical and emotional
states, and its privileging of the body as real and valid over the emotions as
excessively inchoate and soft, allowing the law to begin to comprehend the
mind in the body and the body in the mind.

